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THE DYNAMICS OF INFORMAL PROCEDURE: 
The Case of a Public Housing Eviction Board 
At first blush, "informal procedure" sounds like a n  oxymoron, for procedural rules more 
than anything else seem to give law its formal qualities, and our image of informal justice is a 
picture of justice unencumbered by the need to comply with procedural rules like discovery rules or 
rules of evidence. Yet the fact that  a tribunal is informal and that  it doesn't follow familiar legal 
rules of procedure does not mean that  it is ruleless. Legal rules may in fact structure much of 
what goes on in informal tribunals, for they may specify actions that  the tribunal must or may not 
take, and practical experience may give rise to procedural routines that  are honored a t  least a s  
regularly as  the procedures specified in those formal rules that  in theory order behavior in 
ordinary courts. 
Indeed, informal procedures like formal procedural rules are  typically adopted,with specific 
substantive goals in mind. Thus the small claims court was conceived as  a forum in which 
procedural rules were relaxed so that  plain folk such as tradespeople, lodging housekeepers and 
wage-earners would be allowed to use the machinery of law.' This does not mean, however, that 
the substantive goals that  informality aims a t  will be achieved. The very informality of small 
claims courts may mean that  some individual plaintiffs do not effectively make out viable legal 
cases. (O'Barr and Conley, 1985) Indeed, some have argued that  informal procedures generally 
may serve to extend state control over the working class and poor while denying these classes the 
full benefit of their legal r ights2 
See, e.g. Smith (1919); Cayton (1939:205:57); for a general discussion of the history and practice of small claims 
courts see Yngvesson and Hennessey (1975). 
These are, for example, themes in a number of the essays in Abel (ed.) (1982). See especially Abel's essay in 
. . 
Volume 1 at page 267, "The~ontradlctlons of Informal Just= . .1 
Evictions in Hawaii 
In this paper, I propose to look a t  an informal legal tribunal - the Hawaii Housing 
Authority's (HHA) eviction board - and I shall ask how the decision to process cases informally 
affected both board action and the implications of that action. I shall identify forces that shaped 
the board's informal procedures and point to outcomes that were shaped by them in the sense that 
different outcomes might have been expected had eviction cases in the system I studied been heard 
by a formal court. A basic point that emerges from the analysis is that adjudicative outcomes are 
patterned but different outcome patterns may be produced by informal procedures that appear to 
change little over time. Patterned outcomes reflect the interaction of recurrent facts with 
substantive norms and will change if either changes over time. Changes in the quality of cases 
heard or the norms governing them may themselves be resultant of or facilitated by the use of 
informal procedures. 
My research findings are based on two trips to Hawaii, one for three months in the 
summer of 1969 and the other for ten weeks during the summer of 1987. During both trips I 
interviewed every sitting eviction board member and all past eviction board members I could 
identify who were still in the islands. I also interviewed virtually every current and past 
Authority official with important management responsibility in the housing area since the board's 
inception, which is to say the Authority's Executive Directors, its Assistant Executive Directors in 
charge of housing, its Supervising Public Housing Managers, its representatives to the eviction 
board, its project managers, and some of its assistant project managers.3 These interviews 
generally lasted between thirty minutes and two hours with most being in the hour to hour and a 
half range. The 1987 interviews were taped and transcribed. I also reviewed during both trips 
the minutes of the HHA's Commission, searching for matters relating to evictions, and I examined 
The spacing of my two trips to the field allowed me to interview virtually everyone who had held these roles 
between 1957 and 1987. A few people were deceased; a few had left the islands; I did not seek to interview every 
assistant project manager, and I also neglected several project managers who served briefly in the early 1970s. 
Some people were interviewed on both my trips to the island, but most were interviewed only on one occasion. 
a number of the Authority's internal operating memos and other records with the same end in 
view. In addition, I or a research assistant read the file for virtually every case that had ever 
appeared on the eviction board's docket from its inception in December 1957 through December 
1985. Information on case characteristics, board actions and tenant characteristics were coded 
from these files. The pre-1969 data collected in 1969 were analyzed in 1970 and 1971 (Lempert, 
1971) and I have drawn from these analyses here. The analysis of the 1966-1985 data collected 
in 1987 is still in an early stage. In addition, in 1987 I talked with a number of lawyers and 
paralegals who had represented tenants before the eviction board or in court, with Honolulu Area 
HUD officials with oversight responsibility over the eviction board, and with people who had 
played leadership roles in the HHA's tenant union. These interviews lasted between about ten 
minutes and an hour and a quarter, depending on the information the interviewee could provide. 
With the exception of one or two lawyers, these groups did not exist in 1969. Finally, with the aid 
of research assistants I reviewed mentions of the HHA in Hawaii's two major newspapers for the 
years of my study, and I reviewed all changes in state and federal public housing legislation 
relating to rent collection from the start  of federally assisted public housing, in the late 1930s, 
through 1986. 
The one major group that is largely missing from this study is the tenants of the HHA. 
The time and money that I had available for this research did not allow me to canvass this group 
and my organizational interests made it less important for me to do so than it would have been 
had I been attempting a full ethnographic portrayal of the eviction process. I did, however, 
attempt to get some feel for the tenant's view of the process by talking with tenants who had 
served on the eviction board and with a few former public housing tenants whom I haphazardly 
encountered. I also asked lawyers who represented tenants about tenants' views of the board. In 
addition, in both 1969 and 1987 I sat  in on every eviction hearing held while I was in the islands 
and so observed tenants caught up in the eviction process. 
The eviction board I examine deals with cases that arise on the island of Oahu (which 
includes the city and county of Honolulu) in the publicly-aided housing projects of the Hawaiian 
Housing Authority (HHA). In order to evict tenants from its projects, the HHA must first secure 
an  eviction order from its eviction board. When an  eviction order is sought the tenant is notified of 
the hearing date, the reason for the action and his or her right to be accompanied by a legal 
counsel or some other spokesperson. Once before the board the tenant hears the Authority's case, 
can question Authority witnesses, tell her own story, present witnesses, make legal arguments 
and plead for mercy. The board decides whether a n  eviction order is justified, and if it is justified 
whether to issue i t  immediately or give the tenant a chance to correct the lease violation. About 
three-quarters of the cases the board hears involve only non-payment of rent,4 and these are the 
focus of most of what I have to say in this paper. In  these cases the lease violation is clear and 
under the general principles of Hawaii landlord-tenant law the Authority has a right to an  eviction 
order if the tenant has  not cleared the debt by the time of the hearing. However, for almost the 
entire period under study the Authority and the board have treated these cases as  if there were an 
outstanding issue: whether to give the tenant a second chance and, if so, on what conditions. 
The rights the HHA accords tenants seem commonplace today, for similar hearing rights 
5 are mandated by HUD grievance procedures and in some circumstances by due process.6 But 
the HHA's eviction board existed for more than a decade before federal law guaranteed hearing 
Other causes include a variety of lease violations which I lump together a s  "trouble cases" and, a t  one time, over 
income. Trouble cases involve such things a s  fighting with neighbors, opening one's uni t  to unauthorized guests, 
parking more than  one car or a car which doesn't work in a housing project lot and keeping pets. Some of the  
trouble cases involve a non-payment charge a s  well. Over income cases involved families who exceeded the 
project's income limits for continued occupancy. The requirement t h a t  these tenants  be evicted was first relaxed by 
HUD, whe; in  the early 1970s regulations were passed t h a t  allowed over income families to remain in  public 
housing if they could not find decent, safe and sanitary housing on the outside, and later  abolished. The proportion 
of cases commenced by subpoena tha t  involve non-payment is even higher than 75% since many tenants  charged 
with non-payment either clear their accounts or vacate before a hearing can be held. In the  early 1980s non- 
payment cases were apparently given a special priority and in a number of years the  proportion of cases brought for 
non-payment exceeded 8 0  percent. 
HUD announced requirements for tenant  grievance proceedings in Circular t h a t  i t  distributed in  1971, but the 
final rules mandating such proceedings and specifying the form they had to take were not promulgated until 1974. 
Since 1978 a grievance procedure has  been available to HHA's tenants ,  but they seldom resorted to this procedure 
when threatened with eviction, and it  need not concern us in  th i s  paper. 
6 *  H o w  Authoritv of the Citv of D u r h m  336 u 6 7 0  (1967). 
rights to all tenants in federally aided public housing, and over the years it has remained unique 
in both its powers and its composition. 
With respect to evictions, the powers of the HHA's eviction board are similar to those of a 
circuit court. The board has the same authority to administer oaths, compel the attendance of 
witnesses, subpoena documents and examine witnesses a s  a Hawaiian circuit court judge. 
Moreover, its eviction orders may be executed by the sheriff or by an official appointed by the 
Authority as  if they were the orders of a circuit court.' Thus, a tenant evicted by the eviction 
board will find her belongings physically removed from her apartment if she does not move 
voluntarily or successfully appeal. 8 
When the eviction board began hearing cases in 1957, it consisted of three Authority 
officials, the HHA's Project Engineer, its Comptroller and its Assistant Executive Director. I call 
this the internal board. Since that time the board has undergone three major changes in 
composition. In 1960 the internal board was replaced by a five member board of citizens, many of 
whom were otherwise active in efforts to aid the poor. In 1970 two tenants were added increasing 
the board's size to seven. In 1979 a second seven member panel was created so that weekly 
meetings could be held without unduly burdening the volunteer members. The panels seldom get 
together and never meet jointly to hear cases, so over the past decade the HHA has had, in effect, 
A tenant  may appeal a n  order of the eviction board to the HHA's board of Commissioners if new facts or evidence 
which "could not have been presented and were not available" for presentation to t h e  board becomes available. If 
the  Commissioners decline to hear a review because there is  no such new evidence or if they review a case and 
affirm the board's decision, the tenant  may then appeal to a Circuit Court. The judicial review follows the general 
pattern of judicial review of administrative action. I t  must be based on the record of t h e  case below, although the  
court may order the  Authority to reopen the case and take further evidence. Review of the  board's decision is  
confined to questions of law and the  question of whether the decision below is  "clearly erroneous" given the record 
a s  a whole. Before 1981 the "new facts or evidence" standard did not apply to Commission appeals, and the 
Commissioners often heard appeals "de novo." From 1981 until  early 1984 t h e  Commission would hold hearings to 
determine whether t h e  requisite new facts existed. In 1984 the  power to make th i s  determination was delegated to 
the  Executive Director. This gave the management staff effective control over the  conditions under which 
defendants are  allowed to appeal, and the staff exercises this  power so t h a t  appeals ordinarily are  heard only where 
the  staff is  willing to allow the tenant  to remain in  housing. 
A HUD grievance panel, by contrast, is essentially a n  arbitration panel which cannot  terminate any tenant right. 
While a Local Housing Authority is  bound by any adverse determination of a grievance panel, the tenant retains all 
prior rights including the  right not to be evicted without appropriate legal action, which in the case of the HHA 
means a hearing before the eviction board. 
two eviction boards. The board composition has also changed gradually a s  new members replaced 
people who moved, resigned or retired. Until recently there was no effort to hold board members 
to fixed terms, and while some members quit after a year or less, most served several years and 
some served for ten years or longer. When the second eviction board was added in 1979 the old 
panel was split and four new members were added to one group and three to the other. The 
infusion of new members may have been as important a change in the board's composition as the 
creation of the second panel. 
The HHA's management of the eviction process has also changed over time. Until 1979 
the person in charge of presenting the Authority's case to the board was an Authority official, 
usually the Supervising Public Housing Manager (SPHM), who had many duties other than 
overseeing evictions, most of which were seen by him and others as more central to his role. In 
1979 the Authority created a new staff position with the general responsibility of overseeing the 
eviction process. This includes approving managerial requests for eviction, prosecuting cases 
before the eviction board, and handling appeals to the HHA's Commission. The first person to fill 
this position was not a lawyer but the two people who succeeded him have been.' At the same 
time this position was created a full time secretaryladministrative assistant was assigned to this 
area. The woman who has handled this position from its inception ensures that cases forwarded 
by the project managers are promptly processed, checks to be sure that subpoenas are served in a 
timely fashion and speeds the paper work necessary to ultimately evict after a decision has been 
reached by the board. In addition she serves as the eviction board's secretary, and is the only 
member of the Authority present during their deliberations. She also processes appeals after 
board decisions, and is an informal advisor to numerous tenants who call her, sometimes in a state 
of panic, after receiving an eviction notice or being told by the board that they are evicted. Her 
efficient performance is as important to the efficacy of the HHA's eviction process as any other 
single factor. 
I shall treat the situation as i t  existed in the summer of 1987 as if i t  were the present situation. There have been 
some dramatic changes in the Authority since then; one of the less dramatic has been a change in the Authority's 
representative to the eviction board. 
Associated with these changes have been changes in case outcomes. To put it simply, for 
most of its existence the Independent board was far less likely to evict than the board that had 
been composed of Authority officials. Recently, however, the independent board has been more 
prone to evict than a t  any prior time in its history to the point where it votes to evict a greater 
proportion of,tenants owing rent than did the internal board. One task of this paper is to suggest 
that the informality of eviction hearings may have contributed to such radical changes in outcome. 
But this is getting ahead of the story I wish to tell. First, more basic matters deserve attention. 
Informal Justice 
As Abel notes, when we speak of institutions of informal justice, we are nonetheless 
speaking of legal institutions - bodies that "declare, modify, and apply norms in the process of 
controlling conduct and handling conflict." (Abel, 1982) What makes legal institutions informal 
is, to paraphrase Abel, that to some-degree they have a t  least some of the following 
characteristics: a non bureaucratic structure, relatively little differentiation from the larger 
society, minimal use of professionals, and a tendency to eschew official law in favor of substantive 
and procedural norms that are vague, unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc and 
particularistic. These characteristics combine to give such institutions a naturalistic rather than a 
legalistic tone. Parties before them feel less removed from the world of ordinary discourse than 
they do in more formal or legalistic tribunals. They speak on their own rather than through 
professional intermediaries; they address their judges a s  people and are directly addressed by 
them; the expected mode of conversation is ordinary English or folk variants, so if specialized 
legal language is used its meaning is explained, and charges and excuses are advanced and 
discussed in a common sense way. A tribunal, however, need not have all these characteristics to 
be informal, and a tribunal might have many of them and still appear formal, for Abel's list does 
not constitute the defining conditions of informality, but rather a set of parameters that need not 
move together. lo Thus a tribunal may make minimal use of professionals but explicitly rely on 
official law. I t  may employ common sense procedural norms, but they may be applied routinely 
rather than in an ad hoc fashion, or in ways other than procedure the tribunal may be relatively 
differentiated from the larger society. 
Yet we, and here I mean not just social scientists but also, I believe, litigants tend to 
categorize tribunals as  formal or informal rather than think of them as  distributed along a 
continuum. In a world of variation how is such categorization so easily accomplished. The 
answer, I think, lies in Goffman's (1974) concept of keyinz. l1 Certain features of a situation - 
keys12 - can transform what is going on for both participants and audience by altering the frame 
in which the activity is perceived. Thus what is in fact a trial with legally binding and 
consequential results can be transformed in the eyes of both participants and observors into an 
informal hearing or even "informal justice." 
I hypothesize but, since the question is empirical, cannot prove that there are several keys 
to informal justice. One is a procedure in which the participants are allowed to and tend to follow 
the rules of ordinary conversation and story telling, what Goffman (1974) calls "informal talk." A 
second is that one or more persons who lack legal training is obviously in charge. A third is the 
tribunal's own characterization of itself - as an informal forum or as  an official court of law. In 
addition there are a set of factors that are such powerful cues to the likely existence of these keys 
lo Abel noted this  in  a letter commenting on a n  earlier version of this manuscript dated April 27, 1988. 
l1 I am indebted to Shelly Messinger for calling my attention to the  implications of Goffman's Frame Analysis for 
my work and noting t h a t  informal justice is a transformation of a transformation. Goffman argues t h a t  keying 
transforms a naturalistic experience - a s t r ip  of activity - into something else. The institution of a court is  one 
product of such keying, for we recognize t h a t  argument in  court i s  not ordinary argument but  is  instead a stylized or 
ceremonial argument t h a t  has  i t s  own special s e t  of rules and consequences. Particular cues like the presence of 
judges and lawyers, allow us to recognize t h a t  we are  in court. To perceive a n  informal tribunal is  to recognize first 
t h a t  we a re  confronting a court and then by reference to certain keys to realize t h a t  i t  is  not precisely a court (in the 
usual sense of t h e  word) t h a t  we are confronting, bu t  a n  informal tribunal. In  th i s  sense, identifying a n  informal 
tribunal involves a transformation of a transformation. 
l2 Goffman would use the term "cue" where I use the term "key." A "key" for Goffman is  a key in the sense of a 
musical key, which specifies the mode or form t h a t  a particular s t r ip  of activity is perceived (heard, in music) to be 
in. I am using "key" in the sense of "key features", like key signatures, which lead us to perceive the key - in 
Goffman's sense - of a s t r ip  of activity. I believe th i s  usage extends bu t  is  consistent with Goffman's analysis. 
as to serve a s  keys themselves. These cues involve the location of the tribunal (e.g. in a 
courthouse or a storefront), the place of the hearing (e.g. in an ornate courtroom or in a plain 
meeting room), the dress of the participants and the like. Ordinarily, those features that are key 
to the perception of an informal tribunal vary together, but they need not do so. Where they do 
not - and to the degree they do not - participants are, I expect confused about whether they are 
before an informal tribunal or an ordinary court. The confusion may be resolved by contrasting 
the characteristics of the tribunal in question with the experience or image of recognized courts. 
Thus one litigant may respond to a tribunal that presents mixed keys by drawing on experience to 
say "this is just like a court," while another contrasting the tribunal with a different experience or 
an unexperienced image of high legalism may feel that his case is being handled informally. 
I do not claim that my list of those keys that trigger an informal frame is exhaustive, and 
it is possible that I have missed a key as  important a s  those I mention. However, the exclusion of 
several factors on Abel's list is intentional, for I do not think that they serve a s  important keys as  
to how we frame our perceptions of a tribunal. Among those factors intentionally excluded are the 
bureaucratization of the court structure (apart from the hearing itself), the differentiation of the 
tribunal from the larger society, and a tendency to eschew official law. Thus, I make the 
empirical prediction that even if a tribunal were a t  the formal (or legalistic) end of each of these 
dimensions, if it were a t  the informal end of the dimensions that are the hypothesized keys to the 
informal frame participants (as well as  most social science observors) would regard the tribunal as 
informal. Conversely, a tribunal which employed professional lawyer-judges, which strictly 
followed rules of evidence and which announced a t  the start that it was a court of law would be 
regarded as  a formal court no matter what its status on the excluded dimensions. When the listed 
keys to a tribunal's formality were mixed, participants would, if this perspective is corret, resolve 
the issue not by reference to the tribunal's position on omitted dimensions, but by looking to the 
exact mix of key characteri~tics '~ and the contrast between the tribunal's positions along these 
l3 It may be that the keys themselves are lexically ordered. A tribunal's self-characterization might be more 
important in determining whether i t  is regarded as  informal than whether evidence i s  presented conversationally, 
and this in turn might be more important than whether the presiding judge is a lay person or professional. 
dimensions and images of formal and informal courts. Both judgments of informality and the keys 
to framing a tribunal as  informal may be culture specific, which means that judgments may vary 
within a multicultural society. The researcher's perspective (and my perspective here) is most 
commonly shaped by the comparison with the image of the formal western court. This biases 
judgments about the character of particular alternative tribunals in the direction of informality. l4 
Culture specificity also m a n s  that we probably err when we classify certain tribunals in less 
developed societies as  informal. What are keys for us may not be for those who live in the society 
we observe. Thus, the Kpelle (Gibbs, 1963) may have regarded their moots as  a formal 
proceeding and the Lozi almost certainly regarded their kutas in this way (Gluckman, 1955). 
The phenomena of keying does not mean, however, that Abel is wrong when he lists 
variables that do not key perceptions of informality as  constituents of ideal-typical informal 
justice. Social scientists may define types to serve their purposes. Not only is there reason to 
suppose that measures of the informality of tribunals on Abel's excluded dimensions will be 
correlated across tribunals with measures of informality on the key variables, but the image of 
what informal justice is about and conclusions regarding its faults and virtues often assume the 
states on these dimensions that Abel posits as  characteristics of informality. What is important to 
remember, however, .is that if the key variables determine perceptions of informality, assumptions 
about the situation of "labeled informal" tribunals on the excluded dimensions are weak ones. 
Even if there is an empirical correlation, this correlation unlike the empirical correlation between 
key variables did not play a part in the labeling decision. There may in fact be no correlation, but 
the tribunal will still be considered informal. 
Whether the keys a r e  lexically ordered and, if so, what t h a t  order is  are  empirical questions t h a t  I cannot answer 
based on the research reported here or on what  I know of the literature. 
l4 One contribution of a number of the authors in  The Politics of Informal Jus t ice  (Abel, 1982) is  to remind us t h a t  
for many purposes t h e  appropriate comparison is  with officially formal courts a s  they in fact behave. One reason 
why institutions of informal justice may paradoxically extend s ta te  control is  because they a re  in  fact more formal 
i n  their  treatments of cases than the  procedures t h a t  the formal legal system would otherwise employ. Contrast, for 
example, the lecture t h a t  a police officer might give a youth who persisted i n  playing loud music a t  1:00 a.m. with 
the  hearing t h a t  might  occur if the case were diverted from a formal court (which would never in fact have time to 
concern itself with such a trivial offense) to a n  informal tribunal. (See e.g., Felstiner and Williams, 1978). 
There is one final, general point I wish to make before examining the situation of the 
eviction board. This is that in discussing informal justice, or informal tribunals the natural 
contrast is with formal justice and formal tribunals. Indeed, this is the language I have used to 
this point. Yet I do not think that "formal" is the appropriate opposing concept. Formal, by itself 
has little meaning for it applies to organizations, ceremonies, abstract models and other non-legal 
phenomena. Therefore the contrast formal-informal has no meaning apart from a concrete 
context. While one might give the term "formal" meaning as  a modifier of "tribunal" or "justice" 
(indeed we know what a formal tribunal is and can contrast it with an informal one), "formal" 
already has a well known meaning within the Weberian tradition of the sociology of law (see e.g., 
Weber, 1968; Trubek, 1972; Kronman, 1983) and a well-known opposite which is not "informal" 
but "substantive." For this reason I propose that in contrast to informal tribunals we speak of 
ones that are "legalistic" in the sense of being infused with legality. Thus the opposite poles of 
those features that are keys to informality are ways of proceeding that hew to specific legal rules, 
persons in charge with specialized legal training, an announced self-conception as a place where 
legal rules hold sway and the physical structures, dress and the like that we associate with the 
"majesty of the law." 
The Eviction Board's Characteristics 
The eviction board I studied would be characterized by most observors, and I believe by 
most participants, as  informal rather than legalistic. Indeed, in an eviction process that is 
bureaucratically organized from the time a project manager first learns by computer printout that 
a tenant did not pay his rent until the sheriff, if necessary forcefully escorts the tenant out of her 
apartment, the eviction hearing is an oasis of informality. The room in which the eviction hearing 
is held has none of the dignity of a courtroom. It  is a long,. narrow room, perhaps thirty feet by 
fifteen feet dominated by a long, narrow table. It's well lit, but its walls are bare. There is 
nothing particularly cheerful or gloomy about it. At one end, the end farthest from the door 
through which the parties enter, the board chair sits with the members of the board arrayed next 
to him along both sides.15 At the other end, the tenant and the tenant's representative, if any, 
sit. Near them on the side of the table to their left will be the manager who has instituted the 
eviction action and is ordinarily the Authority's principal witness, while along the side of the table 
to their right sits the board secretary, who tapes the hearing in case a transcript is necessary, and 
the Authority's hearing officer, who presents the Authority's case. Witnesses, in the occasional 
case where they are present, occasionally sit along the side of the table, sometimes displacing the 
Authority's representatives in the direction of the board members, or more commonly back from 
the table in chairs along the walls. The room and seating arrangements looked the same in 1987 
as  they did in 1969. I didn't see them in 1957 or 1960, but I expect they looked the same then as 
well. 
The board members may appear casually dressed16 and the tenants almost certainly will; 
T-shirts are not uncommon. Ordinarily overt legalism creeps into the procedure only briefly a t  the 
outset - when witnesses are sworn, the tenant is alerted to his right to counsel and asked to waive 
it, and the Authority's prosecutor asks the tenant to verify his signature on the lease, and reads 
the lease section(s) that has been allegedly violated - and a t  the conclusion where the legal 
implications of the board's decision is explained to the tenant and the tenant is told of any appeal 
or other rights he might have. l7 But also a t  the outset the tenant is told that the people who will 
decide her fate are citizen volunteers - including two tenants - aAd that proceedings before the 
board are informal with no rules of evidence. At the conclusion of the case the tenant may be 
l5 Currently the chair of one panel prefers to s i t  closer to the tenan t  along the same side of the table a s  the  project 
manager. 
This doesn't have t h e  same significance in  Hawaii a s  i t  might on the mainland, for even high level bureaucrats, 
like the head of t h e  HHA, are  often found i n  short sleeved shir ts  without jackets or ties. 
l7 On rare occasions t h e  board'chair may make a "legal" ruling during the course of a trial a s  when a tenant  
remembering some television show objects to a n  item of evidence or requests a postponement in the  middle of a case 
because the tenant  suddenly realizes t h a t  i t  would help him if a certain witness were present. 
Most reports of informal hearings do not focus on the legalistic aspects, but  very often they a re  a n  
essential par t  of the  proceeding because they help establish or protect the jurisdiction to proceed informally. Thus 
before proceeding to small claims mediation, parties may be alerted to their right to a judicial hearing and pressed 
to waive i t  or, a s  in t h e  eviction board, parties may be alerted to their right to counsel and asked to waive it. 
casually asked if she has any questions, and the implications of the decision for the actions she 
may or must take will be explained in simple terms. 
The case discussion itself is almost always orderly and follows lay rather than legalistic 
modes of presentation. l8 This, ironically, is mandated by formal law. When the Authority 
adopted regulations regarding the eviction process in accordance with the Hawaii Administrative 
Procedure Act, one of the regulations it adopted was "Hearings shall be conducted in an informal 
manner unless otherwise required by law."19 The prosecutor asks the manager to verify the 
violation and asks the tenant to explain it. They do so in their own words. If the tenant doesn't 
spontaneously tiy to excuse his violation the prosecutor often asks the tenant if she has any 
excuse, and the board members will ordinarily inquire further into the causes of the offense and 
what can be done to correct it. Whether or not the tenant questions the rule he has allegedly 
violated, the board chair is likely to justify it, and some board members are prone to give 
paternalistic lectures on the virtues of conforming to the Authority's rules or the tenant's moral 
failure in not doing so. Individual conversations - almost as  if no one else were present - can 
occur between the tenant and a board member or the tenant and the manager; on rare occasions 
the latter have involved screaming accusations by the tenant. Usually the manager also has a 
chance to talk directly to the board a s  the hearing officer prosecutor will seek the manager's 
recommended disposition before resting the Authority's case and will ask the manager in the 
course of the hearing about the tenant's general behavior. By contrast with the two to five minute 
hearings that one reads about in the literature on housing courts, small claims courts, traffic 
courts and even misdemeanor courts, the most routine eviction cases are seldom disposed of in less 
than 20 minutes time, and hearings of half an hour or longer are not uncommon. An observor 
gets no feeling of assembly line justice, and the tenant accounts for a good portion of the 
l8 Often even the presence of a lawyer does not lead to heightened legalism. Board members report feelings of 
both impatience and annoyance when it  does. 
l9 Chapter 501 17-501-2(c), Title 17, Hawaii Administrative Rules (effective Jan. 1, 1981). 
conversation. In these respects the eviction proceedings in 1958, 1969, and 1987 were generally 
similar. 2 0 
Few legal rules are cited when the parties leave the room and the board discusses the 
case.21 The board decision making follows upon conversation not all of which is directed a t  issues 
in the case. For example, I witnessed a case in which the tenant's fecundity was discussed. More 
relevent conversation might include a discussion of the tenant's truthfulness, speculation about 
whether there is a grudge between the tenant and manager or about whether the manager did 
everything he could to help the tenant or a dispute about what the decision-making options are. 
Occasionally a dispute over decision-making options will be about the law, a s  when the board 
members argue over whether they have the legal authority to impose a particularly creative 
solution.22 Here the board's secretary might be asked for an  opinion. Where precedent is cited, i t  
is not ordinarily to make a point of law but rather to argue for a n  exercise of discretion as  where a 
board member supports a suggested disposition by pointing out that  two months ago a case that  
was factually similar to the case being debated was treated in the suggested way. 
Sometimes even the ultimate decision seems haphazard. For example, a debate about the 
proper outcome might be decided after i t  is suggested that  since one member had won the last 
such debate, he should lose this one, or the board will accept one characterization of how a case 
should be disposed with so little concern that  one suspects that  if another characterization had 
been advanced it would have been adopted. Informality is further evidenced in conversation that  
20 I observed hearings in  1969 and 1987. I had access to transcripts from the  early years of the board. 
21 Until 1969 t h e  Authority's representative to the board remained in the  room with the board members while 
they deliberated. This practice was discontinued in response to comments I made when I was invited by the HHA 
to report on my research and critique i ts  eviction process. In  1987 only the Eviction Board secretary, who will 
typically have been silent throughout the hearing, remains in  the  room during the  board's deliberations. If my 
observations were not contaminated by my presence (and discussion with board members suggests they were not), 
she does not take par t  in the  deliberations, bu t  may answer questions if asked or, on rare occasions, volunteer 
information when the  board discussion indicates t h a t  the  members are  confused about some factual or legal issue. 
22 For example, in  one case I observed the  Authority sought to evict a n  elderly woman who on three occasions had 
forgotten she  was cooking down beans on the stove and left her uni t  leaving the  pot to  boil dry and the beans to 
burn. The Authority was worried tha t  she posed a fire hazard to her  elderly neighbors. The board wondered during 
i t s  deliberations whether they could order the  stove removed from t h e  woman's apartment  and a microwave 
installed. 
does not relate to the case. Some cases are easily disposed of, but the board senses tha t  it would 
appear unseemly to reach an  instant decision. Thus after the decision has been reached 
conversation may ensue for another five or ten minutes about the travels of a board member or, 
a s  in several meetings I attended, plans for an upcoming party. 
Thus both the presentation of the party's cases and the decision making process proceed 
with little attention to the constraints that  officially rule a n  ordinary court of law. People talk to 
each other and consider cases in plain English. While there are references to rules the tenant has 
allegedly violated, the scope of discussion extends far  beyond the issue of whether a rule has been 
violated. (Indeed, in non-payment cases which make up the bulk of the caseload, the fact of a rule 
violation is almost never in dispute.) Non-legal perspectives on misfortune and responsibility enter 
into the discussion a t  both the case presentation and decision stages. Those with no business 
before the tribunal almost never observe the process, and those who have business before the 
tribunal are usually only the parties. Witnesses, except for the project manager on behalf of the 
Authority, are seldom present and lawyers or other defense representatives are also unlikely to 
appear, although over the years several Legal Aid lawyers and paralegals handled more than one 
case before the board and one appeared so often a s  to qualify as  a repeat player. What follows 
from this? What patterns of behavior can informal procedures allow or facilitate? 
Disenchantment and Circumvention 
Informal procedures to the extent that  they invite non-legalistic decisions are  likely to be 
unattractive to parties who have the law on their side and the resources to prove this in formal 
legal action. This was essentially the situation of project managers seeking to evict tenants for 
non-payment of rent. At the same time the informality of a tribunal may make i t  easier to avoid 
than a formal court that  is known to present a legal barrier to arbitrary action. Thus informal 
tribunals can both motivate and facilitate their own circumvention. 23 
23 Formal tribunals can do the same, but ordinarily the circumvention must be cooperative as  in plea bargaining or 
the choice of an ADR forum. 
In the late 1960s a number of project mangers who came to view the board's leniency as 
intolerable developed "bluff systems" to get tenants to leave without a hearing.24 The key to 
every bluff system was that eviction actions are needed only when tenants do not vacate 
voluntarily. Thus some tenants told they had to vacate for a lease violation left without taking 
advantage of the hearing that very likely would have given them a chance to correct the lease 
violation and remain in housing. To encourage more tenants to do this, several project managers 
drafted legalistic-sounding lease termination notices designed to get tenants to think that they had 
no choice but to move. Form One is an example of the standard notification in use a t  one project, 
and Form Two is an example of a specific communication when a tenant questioned his status. 
If the forms didn't induce tenants to leave, other tactics involving misleading information 
were used. Tenants might, for example, be told that they would be evicted immediately if they 
were brought before the board but that they could have four to six weeks to find new housing if 
they signed a vacate notice and agreed to move voluntarily. One project manager bragged to me 
that using this and other tactics, he had "evicted" seventeen tenants in a row without bringing one 
before the board. When one tenant he was trying to evict asked him if the HHA had an eviction 
board, he replied, "It does, you're looking a t  him." Another manager carried things further. 
24 At this  time the Authority grouped its projects on Oahu into 5 major management areas. Each area which 
might consist of a number of separate projects typically totaling between about 800 and 1200 units was the 
responsibility of a single housing manager. The managers had grea t  discretion in how they ran their project and 
collected rents extending even to the choice of collection agencies to pursue tenants  who had left housing with 
outstanding rent  debts. The basic management structure remains intact  today except a s ixth area to handle rent 
supplement families h a s  been created and certain projects a re  not i n  any  area but under private management 
contracts. Area V is  also the responsibility of a private management company, bu t  for our purposes i t  may be 
treated like any  of the major areas. Virtually al l  cases the board hears  come from the  five major areas. 
If the Authority's area structure h a s  changed little over t h e  years, its ren t  collection procedures - 
particularly in  the amount of discretion delegated to project managers - h a s  changed substantially. A computer 
print-out of each tenant 's rental s ta tus  coupled with the fact t h a t  tenants  for more than  a decade have paid their 
rent  a t  banks rather than a t  the project offices means tha t  the supervising public housing manager (SPHM) - the 
central office staff member who is  the  direct supervisor of the project managers and  the direct subordinate of the 
head of housing - knows 'which tenants  have not paid their rent  a s  soon a s  the  project manger. When tenants  miss 
payments, follow-up procedures including the  notices sent,  are  now to a large extent  standardized. Where project 
managers were once allowed and perhaps encouraged to "work with" tenants  behind in their rent, managers today 
must justify decisions not to s ta r t  eviction proceedings against tenants  s ix  weeks or more behind in their rent. 
Form One 
NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF DWELLING LEASE 
This is to notify you that  Dwelling Lease No. , dated the 
day of , between the Hawaii Housing Authority, a s  Lessor, and 
, as  Lessee, for Unit No. , 
, has been terminated on Y 
for failure to renew your Lease according to the Lease provision. 
This means that  you have waived your right to live in the apartment on 
, and we are entitled to take possession of the 
apartment on 
Therefore, demand is being made upon your family to move out of the apartment 
peaceably not later than . If you fail to move out, 
the management will take such steps to regain possession of the apartment a s  it deems necessary 
and appropriate. 
This action is in accordance with the provision of the Lease which you signed with us. 
HAWAII HOUSING AUTHORITY 
Dated at Honolulu, Hawaii 





April 30, 1969 
Dear 
This is to acknowledge your undated letter received on April 28, 1969. 
Your monthly rent payments were delinquent for the past six months. During these 
months, we forwarded your rent reminders and also made home visits, but no improvement was 
made to pay your rent on the due date. 
On April 22, 1969, we found your son, sleeping in the vacant 
unit next to your unit, . He claimed that he did not have the house 
key to , yet your ex-daughter-in-law set up quarters in your unit, without 
authorization. This is in direct violation to covenant "G" of your Dwelling Lease. 
In the past you have violated several covenants, rules and regulations of the Authority 
such as: delinquent rental payments, unauthorized persons, nuisances, dogs in your unit, 
inoperative vehicles, etc. This shows that you are no longer interested in living in the project with 
your flagrant violations. 
Therefore, due to the severity of this case, we are  allowing you until Tuesday, May 20, 
1969, to surrender your unit. If any violation happens from this date to May 20, 1969, we will 
evict you and your family from the premises. 
If you have any question regarding the foregoing, please notify the undersigned 
immediately. 
Very truly yours, 
Public Housing Manager 
Occasionally he would call a friend (also a project manager), give the tenant the telephone, and tell 
the tenant that he was talking to the chair of the eviction board. 
These tactics took advantage of the fact that tenants were ignorant of their rights and of 
the legal hurdles the Authority had to clear when it sought to evict. While ignorance about such 
an  important matter may seem surprising, people are often unaware of their legal rights in 
dealing with acknowledged authorities. This has been found to be true not only of welfare 
recipients (Project, 1969) but also of people whom one might expect to be more legally 
sophisticated such as  landlords confronting housing inspectors (Ross and Thomas, 1981) and 
industrial managers dealing with pollution control officials. (Hawkins, 1984) While the informality 
of the board's procedures had no direct effect on tenant ignorance or the manager's ability to 
circumvent the board, I think it had important indirect effects, 
Although I cannot test the hypothesis, I think that in the late 1960s and early 1970s when 
bluff systems flourished the informality of the board's procedures contributed to the apparent low 
visibility of both the right to a hearing and the favorable outcomes that tenants could expect.25 
Since the hearings seldom involved lawyers there were no professionals to keep track of what was 
occurring or spread information in a client population. Because the board didn't seem like a court, 
tenants who told their neighbors about their experience, before the board may not have conveyed 
the impression that in appearing before the board they were exercising a legal right. Indeed, the 
experience of tenants who received deferred eviction orders was designed to convey the sense that 
withholding eviction was an act of grace.26 Certainly both the manager who would ask his friend 
25 Some mangers complained t h a t  the  board's leniency was well known on the  projects and  made i t  more difficult 
for them to collect the  rent. 'The rent  payment evidence t h a t  I collected did not support this thesis a s  a general 
matter,  and widespread knowledge of board leniency is inconsistent with the working of the bluff system. I did not 
interview tenants  in 1969, but in  1987 I talked to a number of tenants ,  including some who were in  housing in 1969. 
These conversations suggest t h a t  at least  until  recently there was among the tenants  a rather low level of 
awareness of eviction board activity. 
26 Which i t  was in the sense t h a t  a n  eviction could have been legally ordered whenever a tenant  was behind on  his 
rent. But  behaviorally, withholding evictions in  such cases was the usual disposition and while tenants  had no 
legal right to this  outcome, they did have a legal right to a hearing i n  which second chances were the normal 
disposition. The informal procedures l en t  themselves to emphasizing t h e  "by grace" nature of this outcome while 
disguising the fact t h a t  i t  was a usual result. Thus before telling a tenant  t h a t  he was to be given a chance to clear 
his rent  debt, the board might lecture t h e  t enan t  on his  moral responsibility to "keep current" and would emphasize 
how lucky the  tenant  was tha t  the  board i n  this  instance would act  leniently. Interestingly similar practices 
to impersonate the board chair and the friend would have thought differently of the enterprise had 
the need been to impersonate a judge. And the opinions of informal tribunals are not recorded, nor 
are records of their dispositions ordinarily compiled. 
Even more importantly, the board's procedures helped create the conditions that led the 
managers to attempt to avoid board hearings. This is not just because they resulted in lenient 
outcomes, but it is also and in large measure because of the kinds of conversations they allowed. 
In ordinary court, the managers would simply have presented evidence of the lease violation. 
Evidence of how the managers worked or did not work with tenants would probably have been 
declared irrelevant and even if a court was willing to hear such evidence, it would have been 
elicited by the opposing party's lawyer in an acknowledged adversarial confrontation. Since the 
setting was not designed for conversation the manager would not have been expected to respond to 
most of the tenant's complaints, and the judge, except in his rulings, would indicate neither 
agreement nor disagreement with them. 
In the eviction hearings of the late 1960s evidence of the managers' efforts were often 
central. On some few occasions tenants actually interrupted the manager's testimony to dispute 
what he was saying. More often they would blame the manager or staff for some failure, real or 
imagined. When they did blame the managers their accusations were not filtered by an attorney 
seeking to effectively present a case, but were in the tenant's own words and directed to the 
person sitting next to them. Even more hurtful from the managers' perspective, was the fact that 
the board members took such complaints seriously and asked the managers to comment on them. 
Indeed, when a tenant did not complain, some board members took it upon themselves to ask the 
manager what he had done to help the tenant, a kind of judicial intervention that would be less 
likely the more legalistic the proceedings. The result according to several managers was that 
when they took a case to the board, they felt that they rather than the tenants were on trial. 
Thus the informality of the eviction process allowed the proceedings to develop in ways that 
apparently characterized another informal tribunal, the p r e - w  juvenile court. See, e.g. Wheeler & 4. (1968) and 
Shari Diamond tells me that she observed similar behavior by lay magistrates in England. 
created substantial stress in most managers and so was a major impetus toward the development 
of ways to "evict" tenants without bringing them before the board. 2 7 
In 1987 when I returned to Hawaii the situation was entirely different. The bluff system 
had disappeared28 and the managers spoke highly of the eviction board. Several factors may 
have contributed to the disappearance of bluffing, and some might have been sufficient by 
themselves. First, but least likely, the formation of a tenants union in 1970, the appointment of 
two tenants to the eviction board in the same year, and the increased availability of legal aid a t  
about the same time might have increased the tenants' awareness of their rights.29 Second, there 
27 The one manager (of 5) who was active in  1969 who did not a t t empt  to bluff tenants  out and seemed least 
bothered by the board's actions was the one who most saw t h e  board's role - if not i ts  procedures - a s  legitimate 
because of i t s  legal position. He believed t h a t  i t  had its job to do and  he had his,  and if the  board decided to give a 
tenant  a second chance the decision was not his responsibility and  did not reflect any  failure on his part. I t  may 
also be the case t h a t  this  manager's work with tenants was ordinarily so considerate and careful t h a t  the  adequacy 
of his performance in th i s  respect was seldom called into question by the  eviction board. 
Several former managers who had moved up the hierarchy into supervisory positions on the  HHA's central 
office staff seemed closer to th i s  manager than to the others in  t h e  view which they reported taking of the  board 
while they were project managers. Perhaps their perspective on t h e  board reflects one of t h e  qualities which led to 
their promotion, or i t  may be  t h a t  from the  vantage point of central office staff they misremembered their attitudes 
toward the board when they were managers. Also the managers' negative reactions to the  board were considerably 
exacerbated after a liberal minister who saw himself a s  a n  advocate for the poor was appointed. This minister, 
several managers told me, assumed t h a t  the  responsibility for t h e  tenant 's failing lay with the system - which is to 
say  the  manager - and would ask questions accordingly. With one possible exception, the  managers who had been 
promoted to central office positions had not had to bring cases to a board t h a t  included th i s  man. Indeed, in 1969 
many of the managers spoke rather fondly of the board a s  i t  had existed in  1964 when t h e  pattern of evictions was 
essentially the  same a s  i t  was i n  1969 but the quality of t h e  discourse apparently differed, thus confirming the  
hypothesis t h a t  t h e  type of conversations t h a t  informality allowed played a big part  in t h e  managers' reactions to 
the  board and  in t h e  motivation for their efforts to circumvent it. Similarly in  evaluating individual board members, 
t h e  managers referred not to their decisions but to the  style of their  conversation. "Tough" (in conversation with 
the  tenant) was t h e  recurring word of praise. 
28 One way of encouraging tenants  to leave without a hearing was  acknowledged, but i t  involved truth telling 
rather t h a n  bluff~ng. In  1985 the  Authority amended its regulations so a s  to bar anyone who was evicted from 
public housing from ever again being rehoused in a n  Authority project. Project managers alerted tenants  to this  
rule and some tenan t  moved "voluntarily" to avoid i ts  force. Since t h e  probability of eviction i n  1987 was much 
higher than  i t  had been in 1969, these tenants, unless they could have paid back their rent  debts, were unlikely to 
have forfeited a valuable right. 
29 I t  appears t h a t  this  was not very important because t h e  rate  of subpoenaed tenants  who vacated without a 
hearing does not diminish until  about 1978 which is after the  period of greatest vitality of the HHA's Tenant's 
Union and t h e  period of the  most aggressive involvement of Legal Aid in the  Authority's eviction processes. The 
bluff system was designed to - and apparently often did - get  t enan ts  to move without a n y  legal process. However 
tenant  responses after being subpoenaed might reflect a manager's pas t  or continued efforts to bluff them out - i.e. 
they may have been convinced t h a t  legal process meant the  jig was  really up. Treating the  proportion of tenants  
who vacated after being subpoenaed but before their hearing a s  a proxy for the  relative amount of pre-subpoena 
blufflng we find t h a t  t h e  proportion of subpoenaed tenants  vacating without a hearing is 10.8% in  the  period 1964- 
74 and about 5.3% from April, 1982 through 1985. The rate  peaks a t  15.8% in  the period 1975-1977, but  the figures 
was substantial turnover in the managers. The two managers most prone to bluff and most 
extreme in their willingness to create false impressions left their positions in the early 1970s. 
Also in the 1970s and '80s a number of male managers were replaced by women, several of whom 
had social work backgrounds. Even the women who had been managers longest reported never 
having attempted to bluff tenants out. Third, the administration of rent collections and evictions 
became more bureaucratically formal. The notices to be sent tenants were standardized and in 
conformity with HUD regulations notice of a right to a hearing was included when the Authority 
threatened to terminate a lease. Also rent payments came to be made a t  banks rather than 
project offices, thus eliminating a chance for tenant-manager interaction and an opportunity for 
bluffing. Finally, the impetus to bluff disappeared. Not only did the pattern of board decisions 
change so that evictions in non-payment of rent cases became the norm rather than the exception, 
but the quality of the conversations that occurred a t  the hearings changed as  well. These changes 
may themselves reflect implications of informal procedures, a possibility I examine below. One 
point is clear: hearing procedures that changed little between 1969 and 1987 yielded very 
different outcomes. For a long time both the project managers and the Honolulu are HUD office 
thought that such a change could be realized only by abolishing the eviction board.30 But the 
potential for dramatic change in board decision making was there all along. 
for th i s  period reflect the fact t h a t  the Authority's eviction procedures were being challenged by a Legal Aid class 
action during this  period which may have led the  Authority to encourage managers to try to deal with tenants  
without bringing them before the  board, and a t  one point led to t h e  formal cessation of all  hearings. The hearing 
delays in this  period may have given some tenants  a n  opportunity to find private sector housing and may have led 
other tenants  to accumulate debts so large t h a t  they thought a hearing was hopeless. No doubt the managers put  
considerable pressure on these tenants to leave. Significantly 24.2% of all  tenants  subpoenaed before the board 
during this  period were able to settle their problems with the project manager and were allowed to remain in  
housing and another 35.8% may have done so a s  well for their cases were apparently not pursued after the 
subpoena. The comparable percentages of cases in which the hearing was called off after a subpoena was issued 
because the  problem was settled were 7.7% in 1966-74 and 1.8% in  the  April, 1982-1985 period. The latter figure 
reflects i n  part  a then recent policy of holding hearings in  non-payment cases even when the rent  was paid before 
the  hearing. 
30 The managers felt this  way when I interviewed them in 1969. From 1975 until 1982 HUD, in  letters I found in 
the  Authority's files, pressed the  Authority to toughen up i ts  eviction policy and urged a s  a first s tep the  abolition 
of the  eviction board. 
k l e s  From Informal Procedures 
One aspect of Abel's perspective on institutions of informal justice is his observation that  
they tend to "eschew official law in favor of substantive and procedural norms that  are vague, 
unwritten, commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc and particularistic." To the casual or infrequent 
observer, including tenants defendants; these features may seem to characterize board procedures, 
but over time an  observer sees procedural and substantive norms that  are not vague, that  are in 
the context of a given case no more flexible than formal law and that  are seldom ad hoc or 
particularistic. Although the eviction board may differ from other informal tribunals in these 
respects my hunch is that  except in tribunals where judges turn over almost a s  rapidly as cases, 
the eviction board is typical in these respects. The contrary picture that  emerges from some 
studies of informal justice is, I think, an  observer artifact. Either not enough similar cases are 
observed to spot regularities, or the observer focuses on or.reports differences thus hiding norm- 
bound regularities from the reader's eye. 3 1 
With respect to rules what distinguishes the hearings of ordinary courts from those of 
informal tribunals is not their presence or absence but their source, the publicity given to them 
and expectations about whether they will be followed. The rules that  courts officially apply are 
prescribed by law; they are ascertainable by reference to generally available sources, and they are  
expected to be followed so that  the flexible interpretations that  occur all the time may nevertheless 
be occasionally held by a higher body to be legal error. Informal rules on the other hand arise out 
of practice; parties learn of them by proceeding before the tribunal, and deviations from them are 
seldom grounds for reversal by some higher tribunal, often because there is no appellate review or 
when there is review because the rules could legally have been otherwise. The rules officially 
31 Abel as I have pointed out does not list these characteristics a s  reauisites of informal justice. Rather these are 
among the features a subset of which will, according to Abel, characterize any institution of informal justice. As 1 
suggested in my discussion of keying I believe that certain of these characteristics, such a s  flexibility and 
particularism, are not used to differentiate institutions of formal from those of informal justice. Indeed, I would 
argue, with considerable Realist and Critical Legal Studies support, that official courts are more flexible than they 
appear. I would also argue that informal institutions are less particularistic than they appear. 
applied in courts are, in sum, legal in origin; they are captured in some official pronouncement. 
Informal rules are generated by the tribunal and can be changed by it.32 They are often no 
vaguer than oficial rules, but because they are not reduced to writing they may appear vague to 
inexperienced litigants. They reflect regular responses to the procedural and substantive issues 
that the tribunal confronts on a recurring basis. One might say that, "Familiarity breeds 
precedent". 33 
Many factors influence the quality of the various rules that informal tribunals develop. 
One factor that is often ignored is official law. Since many informal tribunals, like the HHA's 
eviction board, occupy a niche which official law provides, they must often accommodate 
themselves to certain legal requisites as  they proceed informally. Consider, for example, the 
introductions to two eviction hearings I witnessed. 
Panel I 
(Chair) O.K. In conforming with Section 360 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes this hearing 
relating to docket #87-90 - [Tenant] is hereby called into session. For the record 
my name is , I will be the chairperson today of this 
[Panel 11. I, as  well as  the other members of this [panel], donate our time as  a 
community project. We work for free, if you will. I would like to introduce the 
people to you, beginning with the lady to my left, . . . The purpose of this [panel] 
and one of the reasons we are here today is to hear cases such as  your case and in 
your particular case the Authority is charging you with non-payment of rent and 
chronic delinquency. We ask that you allow the Authority to overview the 
statement in front of you, the statement of charges, and we ask that you respond 
to these charges. Should you have rental receipts with you, or should you have 
witnesses you may bring those into evidence and to support your position. Do you 
have any rental, have you made any payments a t  all, do you have any rental 
receipts with you? 
(Tenant) No I don't. ' 
(Chair) Well then that is no problem, O.K. Have you understood everything and heard 
everything that I have said so far? 
(Tenant) Yes. 
32 The common law is also generated and changeable by courts,.but the courts that do the law making are 
ordinarily appellate courts rather than those that try cases. 
33 See e.g. the discussion of "shallow case logics" in Lempert and Sanders (1986; 75-78). 
(Chair) Do you feel that you can continue with the hearing without the benefit of counsel? 
(Tenant) Yes. 
(Chair) Let the record so indicate and without further ado I will turn this hearing over to 
the hearing officer for the Authority. 
Panel 2 
(Chair) According to Section 360-3 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes this hearing relating to 
the case of docket #8780 is called to order. F O ~  the 
record my name is , and I will be the presiding 
officer before Panel 23. The other members of the board are ... We are here to 
receive testimony and evidence-to determine if your rental agreement should be 
terminated with cause and that you should be required to vacate your unit. 
Yourselves and the Authority are party to this hearing. You will have the right to 
present evidence and call witnesses to support your position, you have the right to 
cross-examine witnesses or repudiate evidence that the Authority may present. 
You have the right to be represented by an attorney, or someone else to speak for 
you or you may speak for yourself. 
(Tenant) Yea. 
(Chair) The rules of evidence a t  this hearing are relaxed and as the presiding officer I will 
make all final rulings of law. If there are no motions, [Hearing officer] please 
proceed. 
First, consider the introduction to the Panel 1 hearing. While this introduction may appear 
informal to the tenant or reader, after one has heard essentially the same introduction ten times 
one is aware that the specific details of this introduction reflect procedural norms that have been 
institutionalized a t  least within this panel. Indeed, in this instance it is a norm reduced to writing, 
for Chair 1 is following a "script" provided by the Authority. However, the script itself simply 
replicates a mode of commencing proceedings that was in large measure standard and unwritten 
twenty years before. Some elements such as the introduction of board members and the 
statement that they are volunteers simply grew out of what was a natural practice. Other 
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elements such as  the explicit notice of a right to counsel reflect an understanding of what due 
process requires in this setting; an understanding, incidentally, that is not reflected in the 
standard introduction of twenty years ago. Still other elements such as the discussion of rental 
receipts are not part of the script but reflect long time habits of the Chair which are now a regular 
part of Panel 1's procedures. 
Contrast this with the introduction used by Chair 2 in his Panel. I t  is based on the same 
script used by the Chair 1. Many of the elements are the same. The case is announced by docket 
number and the applicable law cited. The tenant is told of the charge and of her right to present 
witnesses and is also alerted to her right to counsel. However, Chair 2 did not note that the board 
members were volunteers, which is part of the script, and mentioned that he would make rulings 
on matters of law which is not. Nevertheless the introduction in each panel is governed by similar 
rules. 
There is, the reader may have noted, a very different flavor to the introductions, but it is 
probably a mistake to attribute these differences to the fact that the eviction panels are informal 
tribunals. One can find similar differences in the way judges in ordinary courts address juries or 
the parties before them. Indeed, it may be a mistake to think that tenants hearing the second 
introduction anticipate a more legalistic procedure than thoses hearing the first. While the Panel 
1 Chair engages the tenant while advising her of her legal rights, the Panel 2 Chair delivers his 
introduction in a rapid monotone which suggests that "all this legalism doesn't matter, so let's get 
on with it." This difference, like the difference between the ways that the two chairs embellish the 
central script, probably reflects the personalities of the two chairs and the attitudes they take 
toward their role. I t  should not be surprising that Chair 2 takes a more legalistic attitude toward 
substantive decisions, while Chair 1 believes more in arranging accommodative outcomes. 
Procedurally the remainder of the proceedings are just as  norm-bound as  the introductions. 
The prosecutor must introduce the rental agreement and get the tenant to acknowledge that she 
has read it,34 and he must summarize the details of the lease violation. The tenant and the 
34 The rule is procedural, not substantive. In one case I observed the tenant said she had not read the lease 
because she did not read English, after a bit of hemming and hawing the case proceeded anyway. 
manager are each assured a turn to speak. The manager is ordinarily a crucial witness in trouble 
cases and is regularly asked in non-payment cases whether apart from not paying the rent the 
tenant family has caused any other difficulties. There is also a sense that the tenant ought to be 
attended to. If, for example, a non-payment tenant doesn't speak up without prodding, she is 
asked why she has been having payment problems. Also questions from the board members 
seem to be obligatory. In several sessions I observed there seemed to be no need for inquiry, but 
the board chair took it upon himself to ensure that the tenant was asked some questions. The 
procedures were essentially the same twenty years ago, although the substance of the discussion 
differed somewhat since the board a t  that time was applying substantive rules that differed from 
what they are today. 
Substantive rules may also be generated by informal tribunals, for when a body hears case 
after case it develops its own principles for imposing order. For example, early in its existence the 
independent board developed a rule that tenants who owed rent and showed up for their hearing 
would, unless they lacked all ability or intention to pay their debt, be given a second chance to 
remain in housing. The mechanism by which this was accomplished was to order the tenant's 
eviction but to defer the execution of that order on the condition that the tenant make payments 
toward her accrued debt and pay future rental obligations as  they were due. A tenant who did not 
pay on schedule was subject to the immediate execution of the outstanding eviction order. 
This procedure and mode of decision is nowhere sanctioned by law. Indeed, were the board 
an ordinary court in every such case the law would have required a decision for the 
1andlordIAuthority. However, the independent board did not invent this procedure. I t  had been 
used by the internal board of Authority officials where these officials thought it appropriate. This 
remedy was an unexceptional one for them since their chair, the HHA's Assistant Executive 
' Director, ordinarily exercised supervisory responsibility over the managers. What the 
independent board did was to transform a procedure, which granted occasional reprieves on the 
basis of close case by case examinations of tenant situations, into a rule of precedent, which 
applied to all non-payment tenants and for all practical purposes was a rule of substantive law. 
Thus, in 1969 I sat  in on board decision making sessions in which some board members predicted 
that the tenant would never pay her debts but nevertheless voted to defer eviction because that 
was the way these cases were handled. 
The establishment of a precedent means that cases do not have to be probed as  deeply as  
they must when a decision maker confronts them as  unique problems with potentially unique 
solutions (Lempert and Sanders, 1986). Transcripts were available for the independent board's 
early cases. We see evidence for the development of precedent by arraying cases in the temporal 
order in which they were heard. The correlation between transcript length and temporal order for 
56 non-payment cases that the independent board heard in its first two years of existence was - 
.538.35 I believe this pattern exists because the board initially treated each non-payment case on 
its merits and decided on what seemed to be an appropriate resolution. .But as time passed and a 
rule of law developed, the board's verdict was no longer problematic and only a few questions were 
needed to see into which precedential category a case fit. Since most tenants could make colorable 
promises to repay their rent debts and could give some indication of how this might be done, the 
conditional deferral was the routine outcome, accounting for about 95% of the board's non- 
payment dispositions between the middle of 1960 and the middle of 1 9 6 9 . ~ ~  Indeed, by 1966 the 
precedent was so strong that in only two of 86 cases of non-payment that the board heard 
between then and 1974 did the board evict a t  the initial hearing. 
35 Transcripts were only available for the  first two years of the  board's hearings. After t h a t  the  Authority 
continued to record hearings but  ceased routinely to transcribe them. The transcripts analyzed ran from case 22 to 
case 122. Some cases did not involve non-payment and others were closed without a hearing. The first 20 cases are  
not included in the  analysis because a s  will become clear below t h e  independent board did not become fully 
independent until  the Authority's Assistant Executive Director, the  Chair of the  Internal Board, ceased to represent 
the  Authority before it. 
36 The negative correlation between transcript length and case order cannot be explained by a n  increase over time 
in board eff~ciency, familiarity with the  hearing procedures or caseload pressure. For fifteen over income violations 
over the same period the  correlation between transcript length a n d  case order is  a n  insignificant .031 which is 
significantly different from the  negative correlation in  non-payment cases a t  the .05 level. This is to be expected, for 
each over income case was unique on its facts, and the depth of t h e  required exploration depended on the facts of 
the case rather  than  on the  easy fitting of facts to categories for disposition. Of course, had the  board faced a s  many 
over income cases a s  i t  did non-payment cases i t  might have spotted commonalities and developed precedents i n  
this area a s  well. 
Judicial Values 
I t  is no secret that judges follow not only the election returns but also values to which they 
personally hew. But it is also the case that judges are constrained by their understanding of the 
law and their conceptions of the role they are to fill. One might expect the decisions of an 
informal adjudicatory tribunal to be even more reflective of the judges7 values than the decisions 
of an ordinary court since the openness of the procedures allow an appeal to a range of values that 
could not be addressed in legalistic proceedings and because the constraints of both written law 
and the possibility of an appeal are nonexistent or small. The expectation that personal values 
will have a greater effect on decisions when procedures are informal than when they are legalistic 
may be justified, but the Hawaiian data suggest that the relationship between values and 
decisions is no simple one. I t  too is mediated by the judge's perception of what law and role entail, 
and the influence of personal values on decisions is considerably softened when the decision is 
entrusted to a diverse panel rather than to one individual. 
For example, during the period 1960 to 1969 virtually every vote the eviction board took 
was unanimous. But the unanimity did not reflect a basic value consensus by members of the 
board apart from their conception of what their role and the law entailed. For example, eight of 
the independent board members who served in the 1960s agreed with the statement that most 
non-payment tenants will improve their rent payment habits if given another chance by the board, 
three disagreed, and one was undecided. The numbers are the same but the direction of 
agreement is reversed when the statement is "Troublesome tenants never change." Yet these 
board members voted together on almost every case. 
The unanimous votes reflected the existence of a strong precedent in non-payment cases, a 
shared understanding of what the law required in over income cases, and a tendency to strive for 
consensus or the appearance of consensus which is common in small decision-making groups. 
These features are ordinarily enough to override decision propensities based on personal values. 
We can better appreciate this because the board members' value preferences surfaced in a subtle 
way in a situation where norms were absent. In each case after some discussion the board chair 
would either summarize what had been said and invite a motion to defer or evict or some member 
would attempt to capture the consensus by making such a motion.37 When the 17 independent 
board members who served during the 1960s were classified by their latent roles,38 those with 
latent roles that suggested a special concern for the poor made 69% of the motions to defer but 
only 42% of the motions to evict while those with latent roles that did not suggest such a concern 
made only 31% of all motions to defer but 58% of all motions to evict. The Chi Square statistic for 
this distribution is significant beyond the .005 level, so we can be confident that the board 
members' behavior in making motions was being influenced by attitudes associated with their 
general positions in life. Yet these attitudes had no apparent effect on the members' voting 
behavior because virtually all votes were unanimous. There was, as  we shall see shortly, some 
slight effect of members' attitudes on decisions the board reached, but the effect was slight 
because these decisions were constrained by a shared normative sense of appropriate 
dispositions. 39 
37 In only a small handful of cases was a n  acquittal a real possibility, for except in  certain trouble cases the 
tenant  did not dispute the existence of a lease violation. 
38 By latent  roles I mean the occupational or voluntary association roles thatordinari ly  occupied the board 
members' working !ives. Ten board members who were either ministers, social workers, or involved in extensive 
volunteer social service activity with the  poor were before voting and attitudinal da ta  were examined predicted to 
be lenient. Seven board members who fell into none of these categories werepredicted to be strict. 
39 This is  confirmed by the pattern of decisions in  over income cases where formal law rather than  board precedent 
imposed a bias toward strictness in  t h a t  t h e  board members ,were told t h a t  federal regulations gave them no choice 
b u t  to evict families who had gone over t h e  income limits and not moved within s ix months.'counting a s  evictions 
cases where the board deferred for only a limited period of time (usually a month) to give a tenant  family an 
opportunity to find a home, there is no significant difference between the  pattern of decisions by the internal and 
independent boards with the latter evicting about nine out of ten families a t  the  initial hearing. Families escape 
eviction for over income when they can show t h a t  their income has  diminished to the point where i t  no longer 
exceeds the income limit. The one case in  which the  board came closest to nullifying the  law was a n  over income 
case in  which a family with eight children had used up their s ix  month grace period while a house was being built. 
The day  before the family was to move, the  house burned to the  ground. The Authority brought the family to the 
board, claiming t h a t  the law allowed them no choice but to evict them. The board refused to evict, deferring a 
decision on several occasions, and the  board chair personally tried to find a house for the  family. Ultimately the 
problem was resolved when the Authority moved the family to a three bedroom unit  on a project without income 
limits which i t  administered for the Navy. Because of their lack of a naval connection and their family size, the 
family did notqualify for this unit, bu t  strings were pulled to resolve the  first problem and the  second was simply 
ignored. 
This is not to sap that personal values were unimportant to the pattern of decisions that 
the Authority developed or that the effects of these values were not enhanced by the board's 
informal procedures. Had the independent board not initially consisted of a majority of people 
with special sympathies to the poor and had its original chair not been a leader in this respect, a 
different decision-making pattern might have developed at the outset. Moreover, the fact that a 
panel was deciding cases was very important because the panel provided a forum in which the 
prevailing norms, particularly the norm of leniency in non-payment cases could be restated and 
enforced. A single judge free of recorded precedent might well have changed the pattern of 
decisions in non-payment cases dramatically if she thought that non-payment tenants seldom 
improved their payment habits when given another chance. 
Indeed, if we look at all cases rather than just non-payment cases there is evidence that 
the dominance of a particular value position on the board had some small effect on the outcomes 
reached. Considering only those board members who were active in trying to crystalize the 
board's position,40 we find that those predicted lenient constitute 59% of the members sitting in 
deferred cases but only 47% of those sitting when evictions were ordered. In other words in 
typical deferred cases a majority of the active board members in attendance were, to judge by 
their latent roles, disposed towards leniency while in the typical eviction case the majority had a 
more business-like bias. This suggests that in some cases the verdicts would have been different 
had the values of the board members hearing the case been different. Despite the emphasis on 
norms in the analysis thus far, this result is not unexpected since the bulk of evictions in the '60s 
were in cases involving trouble behavior or income violations, such as  fraudulent concealment. 
These causes of action were too infrequent and too diverse to foster precedent41 and so are good 
40 Four board members, all  predicted lenient, made motions of a n y  sort less than half a s  often a s  would be 
expected given the  number of cases they s a t  on and the hypothesis t h a t  board members did not differ in  their 
propensity to make motions. These are  considered inactive members. 
41 The trouble behavior category, for example, includes only 38 cases and involves such diverse causes a s  
prostitution i n  a project unit,  fighting, failing to control one's children, parking two cars, parking a car tha t  doesn't 
run, and keeping pets. In  16 of these cases the board voted to evict. The board, i n  contrast, voted to evict in only 8 
of the 160 pure non-payment cases i t  heard over the 9 years from mid 1960 to mid 1969. 
candidates for the influence of value preferences. Presumably some of the people evicted for these 
reasons would have been allowed to stay had the panel that heard their cases been more 
dominated by members predisposed to sympathy. 
Changing Norms 
To judge by the Hawaiian experience, informal procedures allow not only the 
establishment of norms that control decisions, but also marked changes in those norms. Indeed, 
while I cannot prove it from a case study, I believe informality makes a tribunal especially 
vulnerable to marked change, particularly if key personnel turn over. 
Several aspects of informality contribute to this situation. The first is rules that are 
unwritten. This deprives an informal tribunal of any anchor other than past experience from 
which to argue that a proposed departure from the rule is unwarranted. In part because the 
board's precedent for deferring non-payment tenants had not been written into law, it is easy for 
the Authority's hearing officers to point to the Authority's rules and its lease and claim that given 
a lease violation, routine leniency is an improper disposition. Those who would defend the prior 
practice could point to no equally concrete embodiment of a counter principle. 4 2 
42 I am not asserting t h a t  unwritten rules are  always weak and specially vulnerable to change. They might be a s  
strong and even stronger than  written law in cultures where law wasn't  usually associated with writing and i n  
tribunals where t h e  judges and, if i t  mattered, the audience, were socialized to accept the  validity of the  unwritten 
rules. The eviction board, however, existed in  a culture in  which binding legal rules a re  expected to be written and 
where there was no cultural reinforcement of board norms apar t  from the  board setting. Without written law to 
consult, new members were i n  the position of a jury t h a t  must  be instructed in  t h e  law. The instruction could come 
from either the  hearing officer or from old members. Given membership turnover, the  general sympathies of most 
new appointees, and  the  hearing officer's claim to legal expertise, it is  not surprising t h a t  the board members, with 
no written law to turn to, tended to be guided by the hearing officer's views of appropriate norms. 
I a m  also not asserting t h a t  written law is  always insulated from dramatic change. On the contrary, a 
written norm may be reversed with the stroke of a pen. But  t h e  process to bring about legal change is  different from 
what  i t  is  when t h e  norm is institutionalized in a tribunal a s  unwritten and understood. I have no doubt t h a t  if the  
Authority had had a written norm mandating deferrals i n  the  typical non-payment case, i t  would have changed i t  
before 1987 to make eviction the usual outcome. But had there been a written norm t h a t  was not changed, I do not 
think t h e  Authority's hearing officer would have been able to reverse the  board's prior pattern of decisions by 
insisting t h a t  in  the  typical non-payment case the proper verdict was eviction. J u s t  a s  tenant-oriented board 
members of the  '60s reluctantly evicted overincome families because federal law provided they could not stay, so I 
think the  Authority-oriented board members of the '80s wuld have deferred if they could have been shown by 
reference to some authoritative source t h a t  in  certain kinds of cases deferral was a firm norm. Indeed, lay judges 
A second reason why informality is conducive to abrupt change is that  the subject matter 
open for consideration, what Joe Sanders and I call the "res gestae" of the case,43 is wide. Thus 
new considerations which may press the tribunal to adopt different norms may be introduced at 
any time. Almost any argument is in order. 
Finally, the judges in informal tribunals are generally lay persons. Often such tribunals 
are  authorized by some more formal authority, and they may, as  the eviction board does, occupy a 
decision-making niche bounded closely by law. In these circumstances lay judges may be unsure 
of their proper sphere of discretion and may turn to those with apparent authority or greater legal 
knowledge for guidance as  to their proper courses of action. This makes the tribunal vulnerable to 
rule changes suggested by an  external authority even when the suggestions have no binding legal 
force. Vulnerability is enhanced if the authority appoints the members of the tribunal, provides 
support personnel or dispenses the funds available to it. 
We can see these influences at work in the way the pattern of decisions by the eviction 
board changed at two points in time. In each case a change in the identity and behavior of the 
Authority's representative to the board contributed to a substantial change in the way the board 
decided cases. 
The first change occurred at the independent board's inception. During its first six months 
the HHA's Assistant Executive Director (AED), who had chaired the internal board, presented the 
Authority's case. Then he was promoted to Executive Director and replaced a s  "prosecutor" by 
one of the Authority's project managers. Table One shows how the relative part.icipation of the 
board members and of the parties before i t  changed with the composition of the board and with the 
identity of the Authority's representative. The data a re  based on transcripts that were available 
might defer more to written norms than legally trained individuals, for the latter are trained to realized the non- 
bindingness of precedent and the openness of texts to creative interpretation. 
43 Lempert and Sanders, 1986. See especially Chapters 7 and 8. 
from the inception of the HHA's internal eviction board through the first .two years of the 
4 4 independent board's existence. 
Table One 
Mean Percentage Participation in Eviction Hearings by Actor and Board Type 
HHA Board 
(N= 39) 




(July 1959-Dec. 1959) 
Independent Board: 
Other Prosecutors 
(N = 77) 
(Jan. 1960-June 1969) 
Board 
Members* * 
Authority & Tenants & 
Authority . Tenant 
Witnesses* * Witnesses Total 
101 * 
* does not add up to 100 because of rounding error. 
* *  pr (T) of the differences in mean participation by the board and by the 
Authority < .001 for all possible pairwise combinations of boards. 
The dominance of the AED in both the internal and independent boards is clear. When he 
was chairing the internal board the mean percentage participation of board members was 46% 
/ 
while it was only 33% when the independent board heard cases presented by the project manager, 
44 The transcripts cover 133 cases in ahich hearings were held, 39 before the internal board and 94 before the 
independent board. The total transcript lines accounted for by board members, by the HHA's spokesman and by the 
tenant or tenants were counted for each case and then converted to a percentage expressing the fractional 
participation of each party in the hearing. Lines of less than half the average line length in the transcript were not 
counted, except that  whenever an  individual spoke he accounted for a t  least one line of participation even if he only 
said one word. Where witnesses were introduced the participation of the witness was counted with the 
participation of the party introducing him. A check on whether the tenant category accounted for more 
participation when both husband and wife were present than i t  did when only one showed up revealed no strong 
relationship. 
and the participation of the Authority's prosecutor and witnesses goes from 34% with the HHA 
board to 61% when the AED participated as a prosecutor to 45% when the AEDYs participation 
counts neither for the board nor the Authority. The proportional participation of the tenants and 
their witnesses is virtually the same throughout. 
The AED was, in short, the dominant personality so long as  he participated in the hearing 
process. When he was on the board, he took over questioning that would normally have been part 
of the prosecution's presentation of the case, and when he was the prosecutor he posed the kinds 
of questions that would normally have been for the board to ask. Neither form of dominance was 
surprising. The informality and newness of the process meant that participant roles were not 
clearly defined. The AED supervised those who brought cases to the board he chaired, so they 
were used to looking to him for guidance. It  is also not surprising that the first members of the 
independent board did the same thing. They did not receive any significant training and did not 
know their precise role or the rules they were to apply. Nor were there written rules to guide 
them. Not only was the AED experienced as  a board chair, but he represented the Authority 
whose rules they were enforcing. 
When the AED left, his replacement found himself in a different situation. Now the board 
was experienced and the prosecutor was not. Not only did it not have to look to the Authority's 
representative for guidance, but the prior pattern of deference to the Authority's representative 
was disrupted and the board chair could exert his leadership. As one board member said 
recalling this period of transition: 
The board unbended a bit. I t  seemed to take a more sympathetic viewpoint as  
time went along. In the beginning the Authority said this was an  action for 
eviction and we should do it. The relationship changed as time went along. The 
Authority became less formal. [Did the board become more independent?] Yes. 
45 In the first seventeen transcripts available for cases after the AED left, the Authority representative and the 
Authority's witnesses account for 48% of all participation and the board members for 30%. The overall figures for 
the post AED period are 45% and 33% respectively which suggests that the transformation from the pattern of board 
passivity that existed when the AED was present was an abrupt one. The original board chair was a competent, 
high status individual. This may have facilitated the board's greater assertiveness. 
Not surprisingly the pattern of the board decisions changed. Table Two presents the 
results a t  the initial hearing for cases involving either non-payment of rent or undesirable 
behavior. 
Table Two 
Outcome At Initial Hearing By Board and Cause of Action, 1957-1969 
Non-Payment Only Non-Desirability (Alone 








Evict or Transfer Evict* 
* Five independent board cases where deferral was for a limited period to give the 
tenant a chance to find a home are included with the evicts. 
Despite the small number of cases during the six months the AED served as prosecutor, it 
appears that the pattern of decisions in that period was different from what it was before or after, 
and slightly more similar to the pattern of decisions by the HHA board than to that of the later 
independent board. It is unlikely that in an ordinary court hearing relatively simple cases the 
prosecutor's identity would have such an effect on patterns of judicial participation or on the 
decisions reached. *' 
46 It might affect decisions if the discretion to prosecute was exercised differently by different prosecutors, or if one 
prosecutor prepared cases better than another. But in the eviction situation it was the managers who decided to 
bring cases and were responsible for gathering the evidence. 
This becomes even clearer when we look a t  more recent history. In the 1980s the board's 
eviction rate in non-payment cases increased dramatically. According to board member and 
housung staff informants, by 1987 the board ordered eviction without conditions in virtually every 
case where the tenant before it had an outstanding rent debt.47 The news of this verdict was, 
however, softened by telling the tenant that  if her entire rent debt was paid before the time for 
filing an  appeal to the HHA's Commission had lapsed, she  could appeal and expect to be 
reprieved. 
As Table Three suggests, this transformation of the  board's-decision making is the 
culmination of a process which began in the mid 1970s. The periods were chosen for substantive 
reasons before the data were examined.48 During the first period 1966-74 there was no reason to 
expect that  the pattern of evictions would differ from what  had gone before and, indeed, we find 
that  there is no difference. The second period from 1975-77 was a period of great substantive 
upheaval at the Authority. The eviction process was under attack in a class action brought by 
Legal   id^' and at one point all evictions actions were put on hold. Indeed of 120 subpoenas 
issued during this period only 24% resulted in hearings. The proportion of subpoenas resulting in 
hearings never falls below 78%.in the other periods and is above 90% in the last two. In  addition 
the management of the Authority was changing dramatically during this period50 and HUD 
47 Tenants who have cleared their rent debt before the hearing a r e  also technically evicted, but have their eviction 
. orders deferred on the condition tha t  they pay their rent  on time for the following s ix months. Until  about 1980, 
these cases almost never reached the  board because when a t e n a n t  cleared his  rent  debt before a scheduled hearing, 
the hearing was ordinarily cancelled. 
48 A case is classified by the date  of its first hearing if a hearing was  held or by the  date  of the subpoena if the 
case was closed without a hearing. 
49 The claim was t h a t  t h e  eviction board did not  comply with HUD mandated grievance procedures. Legal Aid was 
correct in  this  claim. For a while i t  appeared as if the eviction board might be replaced by a grievance arbitration 
panel, but  eventually i t  was perceived t h a t  the two were compatible. So few eviction actions give rise to 
adjudicated grievances t h a t  this procedural innovation need not concern us  here. 
50 When I first studied the  HHA in 1969 i ts  entire business was  building and managing public housing projects. 
By t h e  1970s i t  had been given major responsibility to build and sell  housing for middle income families. These 
responsibilities coupled with the responsibilities given the HHA to manage and help finance a program whereby 
homeowners could convert leased lands to fee simples transformed the  HHA from a n  organization t h a t  was seldom 
in the  news to a highly visible political body and also directed much of the agency's attention away from public 
housing. One result was a major reorganization of the Authority following a series of newspaper articles about i ts  
' 
failures a s  a development agency. This led to a change in the law which removed the  Executive Directorship of the 
supervision of the Authority was intensifying a s  general authority to oversee the HHA was 
transferred from HUD's h g i o n a l  Ofice in San Francisco to the Honolulu local area ofice. A 
particular concern of the local office was the Authority's rent collection arrearages and the 
leniency of the eviction board was seen as  the prime source of the problem. Indeed, a s  late as  
Table Three 
Outcomes of Initial Eviction Hearings for Non-Payment Cases 
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Total Cases 87  2 9 64 193 248 110 73 1 
HHA from the civil service rolls and made i t  a gubernatorial appointed position. This was soon followed by the  
resignation of the  longtime executive director of the HHA who had come up through project management ranks and 
his replacement by a person with no public housing experience who saw his task, in  part,  a s  bringing a more 
business like attitude and organization to the Authority. 
Shortly after my 1987 field work was completed, the HHA was divided into two agency's, one with land 
finance and development responsibilities and the other, like the  HHA I observed i n  1969, charged with the task of 
managing public housing and other housing support programs for people of low income. 
September 1982 the local HUD office was pressuring the Authority to abolish the eviction board 
or otherwise make a drastic t r an~format ion ,~ '  and a s  recently as 1986 HUD officials were 
complaining about the board's propensity to put non-payment tenants on conditions. 52 
The period 1978-79 runs from the beginning of 1978 until mid-October 1979. It marks the 
end of litigation about the viability of the eviction board and the first point a t  which the 
Authority's new, more business-like management could begin to place its stamp on the eviction 
process. The Authority's long time representative to the board, who did not believe i t  was his 
responsibility to give the board direction, was replaced during this period. At the s tar t  of this 
period there was a backlog of evictions resulting from the delays attendant to the litigation of the 
prior period. The period ends with the Authority determined to take steps to speed up the pace of 
evictions. 
The last three columns mark the period - which began in October 1979 - of two eviction 
panels. It begins with the division of the existing board into two panels and the appointment of 
four new members to one panel and three to the other. In addition a day long training session 
was held for board members in which the Authority's rent collection problems and the importance 
of the board in rent collection was stressed. These columns are labeled with letters because the 
51 I t  appears that  in doing this HUD had not independently analyzed the situation but was instead echoing the 
diagnosis and solutions for the Authority's rent collection difficulties which the project managers fed HUD auditors 
in their project level investigations. 
The December 1978 response of the HHA's then Acting Executive Director to a HUD suggestion that the,  
board be abolished reveals a sophisticated perspective on the virtues of the instruments of informal justice as  
means of official control: 
The Eviction Board (now designated a s  Oahu Hearing Board) is  the only procedure by which 
evictions can be processed in a timely fashion. A single Hearing or Review Officer on 
management staff would be constantly challenged by the grievance procedure and appeals to the 
HHA Commission. Although these are still options to the tenants, even with the Hearing Board, 
the sense of fair play representation and judicial action seems to minimize grievance and appeals. 
Recourse directly to the courts would not only result in a loss of control, but require lengthy 
delays in scheduling appearances. The inconsistencies tha t  would be experienced under a number 
of different judges might well encourage rather than deter delinquency among the tenants. The 
time factor alone would increase delinquency before eviction is  effectuated. 
52 The officials didn't realize that  by 1986 almost all tenants placed on conditions had paid their rent debt by the 
time of the hearing and the conditions constituted a threat to evict them immediately should they fall behind on 
their rent within the next 6 months. 
periods they mark are defined by the Authority's representative to the board. A was the 
Authority's first full time eviction specialist. He was not a lawyer, but enjoyed acting like one and 
negotiating with lawyers. The period labeled A runs from the end of October 1979 until mid- 
January of 1 9 ~ 2 . ~ ~  Period B runs from January 18, 1982 until February 28, 1984. B was the 
first lawyer to hold the position of hearing officer and was officially attached to the Attorney 
General's Office a s  a deputy attorney general rather than to the Authority. But she like her 
successor was in effect a full time Authority employee and reported to the Authority's head of 
housing. C was a deputy attorney general who became the hearing officer in 1984 and occupied 
this position until shortly after my field work concluded in the summer of 1987. 
It  looks from Table Three as if a major break in the board's routine disposition in non- 
payment cases occurred in the 1975-77 period, for including defaults, evictions that are voted 
when the tenant does not appear, there are five times the number of eviction decisions during this 
period a s  there were in the preceding 8 years.54 However, as  Table Four reveals, the break is 
not as significant a s  it appears. 
The only difference between the eviction board in the 1975-77 period and the board before 
that was that it would evict where a substantial number of month's rent was owing while the 
earlier board would give a tenant a chance to clear her debt even then. Indeed Table Four does 
not quite reveal the strength of the rent debt factor, for in ten of the eleven cases in which the 
1975-77 board evicted, the tenant's rent debt was six months or more. Moreover, there is as we 
53 A actually came to the  Authority earlier in 1979 and handled cases before October of t h a t  year. I begin the 
period I label A when I do because this marks the s ta r t  of t h e  two panel system which even more than the 
appointment of A is  a major break with the  past. Moreover, t h e  training session (which A ran) and new board 
memberships t h a t  accompanied the s ta r t  of the second panel provided conditions t h a t  were conducive to A's 
influence attempts. A left the  Authority before the end of 1981, b u t  cases tha t  arose after his  departure but before a 
permanent replacement was in office are counted in the  A period. A parallel decision was made with respect to the 
transition between B and C. These decisions reflect the  expectation t h a t  the influence of one hearing officer was 
likely to linger until there was another person in a position to give the  board's panels, week after week, 
consis.tently different messages. 
54 Note the figures refer to decisions reached a t  the initial hearings in non-payment cases. In some instances 
tenants  were allowed a rehearing or, in later periods especially, were allowed to s tay  after appealing to the HHA's 
board of Commissioners. In other instances tenants put  on conditions were again brought before the board after 
failing those conditions and either the conditions were changed or extended or the tenants  were evicted. 
Table Four 
Proportion of Eviction and Default Evictions a t  Initial Hearings by 
Period and Months Rent Owed* 
Period 
A B C 
Months RRnt 1166- 1175- 1178- 10179- 1182- 3184- 




More Than 3 3.7% 45.8% 28.3% 52.9% 56.8% 80% 56.8% 
Months (54) (24) (46) (68) (74) (30) (296) 
* Number in parentheses is the total number of cases in the category. 
have noted a substantial selection problem in the 1975-77 period. So few subpoenaed cases 
resulted in hearings that it may be that those that did involved tenants who had both exceptional 
debts and exceptionally bad rent payment histories or exceptionally poor prospects for paying off 
what they owed. This is evident from the fact that during this period 71.4% of the cases heard 
owed more than six months rent a t  the time of the hearing while no more than 27% of the cases in 
any other time period fall into this category. Thus, in the period 1975 to 1977, the board appears 
to have been evicting only where they were absolutely convinced the tenant would not pay back 
his rent, something which they had done occasionally throughout. The 1978-79 period also does 
not suggest a marked change in prior practice. In only one of 18 cases with a rent debt of three 
months or less did the board evict. The board, however, was willing to evict when the amount 
owed was between three and six month's rent and did so in 9 of 27 cases. Indeed those who owed 
more than six month's rent fared better than those who owed between three and six month's rent, 
for only 4 of 19 such tenants were evicted a t  the initial hearing. 
The pattern of board decisions changed dramatically only after A was handling cases and 
the second panel was in place. Then the probability of evictions rose dramatically regardless of 
amount owing. The substitution of B for 9 suggests that the identity of the hearing officer does 
matter, for except when more than three month's rent was owed the board was less likely to vote 
eviction when B handled cases than when A did.55 Yet another change occurs when C takes over, 
for compared to B the probability of evictions rises substantially a t  all levels of debt. Indeed Table 
Four tells only part of the story, for the data extend only through 1985 when C was still trying - 
by his own admission - to impose his views on the board. By the summer of 1987, if my 
observations and interviews can be believed, evictions occurred almost always when tenants 
appeared a t  a hearing with rent owing. But even without this information, Table Four suggests 
the vulnerability of informal tribunals - a t  least when staffed by lay people - to direction from 
authoritative repeat players. 
There is one other change that is reflected in Table Four. At one point cases were 
ordinarily cancelled if tenants who were subpoenaed to a hearing paid off their debt before the 
hearing date. As we see from Table Four, A started bringing some of these cases to a hearing.56 
Often these involved tenants who had a history of chronic delinquency, which is to say a record of 
either often falling behind a month or two on the rent and then clearing the debt before a 
subpoena could issue or of continually being about a month behind on the rent. When these cases 
were brought up, the board sometimes simply acquitted because there was no outstanding debt but 
more often (most likely where there was'history of chronic delinquency) voted an eviction order 
but deferred the execution of the order on the condition the tenant keep her rent current for the 
55 The figures for 0 balance cases may be contaminated by selection bias, for when a t enan t  paid her rent in  full 
before the hearing, the  hearing officer could dismiss the  case. E! brought relatively more (24% v. 18%) zero balance 
cases to the  board than  A did, and i t  may be t h a t  if A was more selective the cases he  brought to the board were 
better candidates for eviction on characteristics like rent  payment history tha t  the d a t a  do not measure. However, 
the  magnitude of possible bias is unlikely to be  so large a s  to explain the differences in t h e  proportion of zero 
balance cases evicted t h a t  we observe. 
56 I cannot be certain, but  the small number of zero rent  debt cases before period A may be cases in  which the 
tenant  paid off the rent  debt so soon before the  hearing t h a t  t h e  board did not know the  case was cleared until the 
tenant  showed up. 
next six months. C transformed the board's attitudes in these cases so that chronic delinquency 
did not matter - the mere fact that there had been a rent debt was sufficient to trigger an eviction 
order deferred on conditions. We see this first in the proportion of zero balance cases in which the 
board acquitted outright. This proportion went from 17.25% (28.6% if  continuance^^^ without an 
eviction order are included) under A to 22% under B to 2.3% under C. Moreover, selection effects 
mean that Cs board was probably hearing less serious cases with respect to chronic delinquency 
than A's board or Bys, for unlike the first two hearing officers C virtually never withdrew a case 
after a subpoena had issued. Thus zero balance cases constitute 18% of the non-payment cases 
prosecuted; 24% of the cases B prosecuted and 40% of the cases C brought to the board. 
The changes that transformed the eviction board in the 1980s resulted from the 
Authority's decision in the late 1970s to speed up and tighten its eviction process, first by devoting 
two staff positions, A and a full time secretary, to evictions and then by dividing the board into 
two panels so that a panel of citizen-volunteers could meet weekly. Along with this a concerted 
effort was made to secure a board that would take a tougher, more legalistic approach to the 
eviction decision. The board training session I have mentioned was part of this effort as  was, 
somewhat later, the Authority's decision to send the chairs of its two panels to the Judicial College 
in Reno, ~ e v a d a . ' ~  In addition, reappointment decisions took account of the board members' 
attitudes, and new appointments were made with an eye to the member's likely positions. (In the 
summer of 1987 three of the five non-tenant members on one panel worked for property 
management firms.) 59 
57 These might be ordered to see if t h e  tenant  would pay her ren t  on time for the nex t  few months. 
The two chairs told me their behavior as chairs had not changed a s  a result of th i s  experience. One enjoyed it, 
and the  other regarded i t  a s  a joke. Subsequent chairs were not s e n t  to judges school, although the HHA's 
Executive Director pointed to this  move a s  one of the  most important things he  had done to toughen the board. 
59 In  addition, effective January  1, 1981 the  law authorizing t h e  HHA to evict tenants  was changed following a n  
HHA produced draft to  make i t  easier to subpoena tenants, to rationalize the process of appeals and in several other 
respects. Neither these changes nor the  promulgation of administrative rules about the  same time seem to have had 
any direct effect on the  board's decision making. As B outlined t h e  board's responsibilities in a memorandum to the 
acting SPHM in 1982, they were legally what  they had always been: 
The Hawaii Housing Authority's hearing boards perform three basic functions: determining 
whether tenants  violated provisions of the rental agreement with the  Authority; determining 
These actions and others created fertile soil for changes in how the board decided cases. 
What was crucial, as  we have noted in discussing Table Four, was the position that the 
Authority's representative took in the hearings. A and B often urged eviction but acknowledged 
the board's authority to defer evictions on the condition that debts be paid in full (although in 1980 
a rule was adopted placing a six month limit on the length of such deferrals). However, C, the 
attorney who next occupied this position, was determined that the outcome be eviction in all non- 
zero balance cases. He developed a standard speech which argued that if the tenant was actively 
in violation of her lease (i.e. owed money), it was the board's obligation to evict. To soften the 
argument he pointed out that the board's decision was not final because the tenant had a right to 
appeal. This he pointed out was the proper locus for merciful discretion.6o The board's 
responsibility, he emphasized, was to decide whether there was a legal violation. At times C 
embellished his standard argument by emphasizing that if a tenant were evicted she would be 
replaced by an equally needy but more responsible tenant from the Authority's waiting list. (2's 
ability as  a repeat player to emphasize these themes again and again, tihe fact that he was clearly 
speaking on behalf of the Authority, and the fact that the eviction board had come to be dominated 
whether the  rental agreement should be terminated a s  a result of the violation; and determining 
whether t enan ts  should be evicted for the  aforementioned violations. 
The change in the appeal provision, which limited appeals to the  Authority's Commission to cases in which there 
were "new facts and evidence" came to have a substantial indirect effect during the  tenure of C for, a s  we shall see, 
he persuaded the  board to abdicate some of i ts  discretionary authority to the Commissioners, and the Authority 
would not have found this workable had the  availability of appeal not been limited in  this  way and had the 
Commissioners not delegated the task of determining whether new facts and evidence existed to the Executive 
Director. 
60 But  t h e  Commissioner's decision, a s  t h e  board knows, is  conditioned on the tenant 's paying back her entire ren t  
debt before the time for appeal has  lapsed. In some cases, c, who after having presented cases to the board then 
processed t h e  eviction orders, would delay the paper work needed to commence the appeal period i n  order to give a 
t enan t  more time to pay her back rent. H e  was a former legal services attorney and saw himself a s  personally 
sympathetic to the  situation of low income tenants, and in internal HHA discussions c took policy positions t h a t  
were more pro-tenant than the positions of a number of other Authority officials. At  one point C complained to me 
t h a t  t h e  Authority's increased efficiency i n  processing cases after t h e  board's decision was limiting his discretion to 
allow tenants  whom he  thought might be good candidates for reform sufficient time to generate the new evidence 
(full payment in  the  case of tenants who owed rent a t  the hearing and a period of full, on time payment in the  case 
of tenants  evicted for chronic delinquency) required for a n  appeal. 
by people not bothered by strict decisionse1 meant that in cases where tenants had not already 
cleared their debt, the board's norm of decision was transformed from one of deferrals on the 
condition that the debt be repaid according to some schedule to one of immediate eviction subject to 
the possibility of a reprieve if, after the board voted eviction, the rent debt was paid in 
This attorney's influence is reminiscent of that of the AED some 25 years before, except the AED 
didn't try to impose a rule of decision on the board but instead attempted to impose his view about 
how each particular case was to be decided. 
I hypothesize that the success of this effort to impose an automatic eviction rule is, like the 
earlier domination by the AED, attributable, a t  least in part, to the fact that the board follows 
informal procedures. Had a right to deferral been enacted into law or been the pronouncement of 
some higher court, the Authority's representative would not have made the case he did. Even 
without a prior writing, if tenants before the board were routinely rather than rarely represented 
by lawyers,63 these lawyers might with some authority have reminded the board of its power to 
be lenient and they might have argued that the board had a responsibility to decide in accordance 
with past decisions. But an informal tribunal even if it in practice follows precedent is not legally 
or necessarily bound by it and can change its precedent when an authoritative source continually 
champions a new rule which most of the board members find congenial.e4 Finally, if professional 
Not only are  there a number of property managers on each board, but  the tenants  on the board are  generally 
quite strict with their fellow tenants. This is  not because they have been selected by the Authority for their 
strictness; usually they have been selected from a short list  furnished by the HHA's tenant  union. Rather i t  is  
because the kinds of people who become active in the tenant 's union a re  good project citizens who for the most par t  
comply with project rules despite their own financial and other difficulties and feel little sympathy for those who do 
not. 
62 The demand for lump sum repayment was less onerous t h a n  i t  would have been a t  a n  earlier point in  time 
because the  Authority's policy of initiating eviction actions before large debts had accumulated coupled with its 
increased efficiency in scheduling hearings meant t h a t  tenants  were commonly brought before the  board with 
arrearages of between one and two months. Often, by borrowing from relatives or other support groups tenants 
could come up  with the money to clear such debts. During the  1960s and '70s debts of three or four months and 
more were common because cases weren't processed a s  rapidly. Tenants this far in  debt had little hope of clearing 
their accounts unless they were given time to pay. 
63 Fewer than  one in twenty non-payment tenants had a lawyer a t  the hearing, and by period C the  rate of 
representation a t  the  hearing was down to about one percent. 
64 The chair of one of the panels who had served for about ten years  on the board will contest the  Authority's 
representative if he goes too far and says in  a particular case t h a t  because there is  a n  outstanding rent  debt the 
judges sat on the bench, they would be cognizant of their power and would be jealous of it. Thus, 
if there was a precedent justifying conditional deferrals in non-payment cases, they would be 
unlikely to change their practices simply because a prosecutor insisted that another rule was 
proper. Of course professional judges are likely to see themselves as bound by the law, which in 
this instance gives the Authority the legal right to evict tenants who are a month or more behind 
in their rent. This is all the Authority's latest prosecutor was asking for. 
We have seen some of the data that traces the transformation C wrought, but in 1985, 
which is the last year for which data is now available, the transformation was not complete. By 
the summer of 1987 when I was again in Hawaii and observed board hearings, the rule making 
eviction the standard outcome when rent was unpaid had been institutionalized, and the comments 
of the Authority's representative were not so much a justification for the rule as they were a 
reminder that there was a new standard. For example,'in one hearing the Authority's attorney in 
the course of the hearing addressed the tenant - and obliquely the board - as  follows: 
O.K. Well given your balance here and what you are saying you are going to do, 
normally when somebody comes before the board and they do have a balance what 
we recommend is that the board order an eviction, but if you do what you say you 
are going to do and you take care of it by the 17th, you do that then we 
recommend that you file an appeal showing that it is all taken care of. If you do 
what you are saying that you are going to do, more than likely you can stay. But 
you have to do that. If you don't there is nothing that we can do to help you out. 
However, I did witness one hearing in which a deferral was granted. The case involved a 
family which in the month before the hearing had paid off $750.00 to cover two month's rent and 
a t  the time of the hearing, on the 28th of July, owed only July's rent. The family had gotten in 
board h a s  no choice but  to evict. He will also point to the board's power to defer cases during the board's 
deliberations. However, with the  exception of one case I observed, h i s  protestations go for naught, and I have heard 
other members say  in  deliberations tha t  the new rule was t h a t  they had to evict. Perhaps because of the mixture of 
old and new members with different ideas of what norms require, board members who served in t h e  1980s unlike 
those who served in the  1960s did not report t h a t  virtually all  their  decisions were unanimous. In  this respect i t  is  
important to note t h a t  the  change in unanimity does not reflect a greater mix of attitudes toward tenants  in  the 
1980s. In  t h e  1960s there were members whose attitudes might be characterized as pro-Authority who regularly 
voted for deferrals, and in the  1980s board members who attitudes show great  sympathy for tenants  regularly vote 
for eviction. What h a s  changed is the balance of attitudes on the  board and the  sense of which dispositions are  
normative. 
financial trouble when a son whose finger had been almost severed had had it sewn back resulting 
in unexpected medical expenses. This problem was compounded, if the man can be believed, when 
the money from a recently cashed paycheck was stolen from his locker while he worked. The 
deferral was to allow the family to spread the repayment of the July rent over two months. I t  
was done because the date on which the man received his paycheck was such that even if he 
applied his next two paychecks to the July and August rent, he might not have a zero balance in 
time for his appeal because the second paycheck would not arrive until after the August rent was 
due. Also the board was influenced by the fact that using the husband's next two paychecks for 
the July and August rent would leave the family with almost no money for food or other 
necessities. 
The fact that deferring eviction in a non-zero balance case had come to be perceived as 
unusual was obvious in the discussion of this case and the remarks made afterward. As the board 
waited for the tenant to be brought back to hear its verdict one member remarked, "It must be 
Professor Lempert's influence; this is the first time we have done a conditional like this in over a 
year." Another member said, "HHA will have a hemorrhage." And a third chimed in, "G is going 
to croak." 
The member was right about C. He was terribly distraught. During the next case which 
involved another non-payment tenant with an outstanding debt, G didn't make his usual pitch for 
an eviction but muttered that given the way the board had decided the previous case he wasn't 
sure what to ask for on this one. Later he complained to a fellow Authority employee who 
sympathized by saying the board would not recognize the facts. He also complained to me. He 
felt that it was unfair that the board was not consistent, and he was worried both that the board 
might be establishing a new precedent (after he had worked so hard to get them to develop a 
precedent of evicting) and that the project manager in this case would tell other managers about it 
with the result that the managers generally would be reluctant to bring eviction actions. I do not 
know what has happened since then, but I doubt very much if these fears have been realized. 
The most recent changes in the pattern of eviction decisions are interesting not only for 
what they tell us about how the decision making of informal tribunals may be transformed and for 
what this story suggests about the way that informal procedures can contribute to certain 
transformations, but also because these changes remind us that informal procedures do not 
necessarily yield results that seem inattentive to law. Under the general Hawaiian landlord- 
tenant law when a tenant is brought before a court owing rent that he cannot then repay, the 
landlord has a right to evict him. This is what the eviction board is now doing in almost every 
case. Yet the experience of tenants before the board and the procedural freedom they enjoy is, 
apart from outcomes, much like what it was thirty, twenty or ten years ago. 





















Consider Figure One. The figure calls attention to the fact that tribunals of informal 
justice are informal along two dimensions which need not be associated. One concerns the quality 
of party participation: whether the parties hew to legal rules of proceeding like rules of evidence 
and develop their cases by reference to legal rules and arguments. The second takes the parties 
style of presenting evidence as  a given and concerns the stance which the judge or judges take 
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toward a case: whether the judge seeks to decide cases in accordance with official legal principles 
or seeks to do what is right by reference to common sense and widely shared norms of popular 
morality.65 Only when both the judicial stance and the party's mode of participation is informal, 
do we have an institution of informal justice. When both are legalistic in nature we have the 
model of ordinary legal adjudication. 
As with all fourfold tables, real world phenomena never fit neatly into the social scientist's 
conceptual boxes. Cells 2 and 3 illustrate this, for the processes given as  examples are not pure 
cases. Court-induced settlements which combine party legalism with an informal judicial stance 
emphasize the procedural aspects of the judicial stance. The judge comes down off the bench, so to 
speak, and seeks to persuade the parties that a certain outcome is both fair and desirable. This, 
however, is often done with reference to official law, and judges will sometimes make or threaten 
legal rulings to induce settlement. Along the other dimension, the parties may act less 
legalistically once it becomes clear that they have established the legal parameters within which a 
settlement will occur. 
Hidden legalism emphasizes the attention of judges to official law, but where the parties' 
participation is informal the judge may also enter the discussion in an informal way rather than 
remain a passive evaluator. Moreover, if the parties realize that the judge, despite the style of 
her participation, is attending to official law, they will, while proceeding in an apparently informal 
manner, be sure that necessary legal ground is covered and that appropriate legal arguments are 
made. If only one party realizes that an informal judicial style does not mean that the substantive 
law has been relaxed, that party will be a t  a substantial advantage. This differential 
65 Ordinarily the  first judicial stance is  associated with judicial passivity while the  second brings to mind the  
image of the judge who is  a n  active participant in the  litigation process, but these associations are  not necessary. 
In  continental legal systems or in  settlement conferences i n  th i s  country legalistic judges are  commonly activists, 
and a substantively oriented judge may simply le t  the parties tell their stories. The empirical association is  (in th i s  
country) expected to exis t  because, on  the  one hand, official law constrains judges to  passivity and a legalistic judge 
is  expected to be oriented to this body of law a s  well a s  to procedural rules and the law governing the  case. On the  
other hand, the judge who takes a n  informal stance will often find t h a t  she  will have to intervene to be sure the  
parties will reveal everything t h a t  she  regards a s  relevant to her decision, particularly if, as will often be the  case, 
the  parties are  proceeding informally and lack clear rules about what  the tribunal regards a s  important. 
understanding of what the tribunal is about is more likely when one party is a repeat player and 
the other is a one time participant. Small claims courts often fit into this cell. 66 
The older practice of giving non-payment tenants a second chance was a common sense 
resolution that had hardened into precedent. Moreover, there was still room for considerable 
common sense in the way the precedent was effected, for the tribunal had to determine from the 
facts of each case what the terms of the.second chance would be. The parties knew what the 
adjudication was about and proceeded accordingly. 
Today, board hearings embody hidden legalism. From a purely procedural standpoint, 
they look essentially as  they always have. Participation on both sides is informal. Tenants 
seldom have lawyers, and the Authority's representative, although an attorney, ordinarily does 
not act much like a lawyer. There are no rules of evidence, and the board members ask questions, 
express sympathy and occasionally give tenants a piece of their mind as they have always done. 
Yet the decision is almost always fully determined by legal criteria. The tribunal applies the 
official legal rule that if there is rent money owing, the landlord has the right to an eviction. The 
tenant's story is probed, but regardless of what the tenant says the decision is almost always 
determined by one basic fact - is there a rentrdebt outstanding. If the tenant realizes this a t  all, it 
is only after some discussion when the Authority's representative tells her that the tribunal's 
usual rule is to evict whenever there is an outstanding rent debt and explains that if the debt can 
be paid after the hearing a reprieve is likely on appeal.67 This transformation from common 
" See, e.g., Yngvesson and Hennessey (1975) and O'Barr and Conley (1985). The O'Barr and Conley article is  
particularly instructive, for they report t h a t  a s  compared with ordinary courts, small claims litigants are often 
satisfied with their experience because they feel tha t  they have had a n  opportunity to tell their story in their own 
words to a person in authority. Yet some of these litigants lose what  could have been winning cases because with 
limited knowledge of t h e  law and without the  constraints of legal form they fail to include in their stories all  the 
legal elements necessary to  a valid claim or defense. 
67 If the t enan t  has  sought advice from Legal Aid before the hearing then the  tenan t  may realize the  legalistic 
nature of t h e  hearing a t  the  outset, for Legal Aid tells tenants  t h a t  unless they pay their rent  they will be evicted. 
Legal Aid came quickly to recognize the  Authority's new policies and the  fact t h a t  t h e  board was implementing 
them. Perhaps because they occasionally tried to negotiate cases with the Authority's representative, they were 
explicitly informed of the  change in the  board's behavior and the Authority's position . Legal Aid's reaction to the  
new legalism was  to discontinue almost entirely the representation i t  had occasionally provided non-payment 
tenants  a t  eviction hearings. They recognized and accepted the  validity of the legal rule the  board was applying 
and were unwilling to  expend their limited resources on cases they were sure to lose. Occasionally they will still 
sense resolutions to hidden legalism was facilitated by the informality which characterized the 
common sense regime. 
Before we leave Figure One note the simplifications that it incorporates for expository 
purposes. I t  assumes that the party takes the same stance toward both rules of proceeding and 
the substantive law (legalistic or informal) and that in this respect the two parties do not differ. I t  
further assumes that the only judicial stance that is relevant is that which the judge takes toward 
the substantive law. These assumptions saved us from having to consider the possible 
intersections of three actors (judge, prosecutor and defendant) whose positions might vary in two 
ways along two dimensions and the unwieldy multi-cell table to which these possibilities give rise. 
By way of illustration, however, it is instructive to consider certain configurations a t  this level of 
detail. 
Recall that the degree to which participants in a tribunal are constrained by legal rules 
and the degree to which a tribunal's decisions are oriented to official law are two of the dimensions 
that were defining variables of Abel's ideal-typical informal justice. I argued a t  the outset of this 
paper, however, that while both variables might well be aspects of ideal-typical informal justice, 
only the character of participation (whether or not it follows legal rules of proceeding) and not the 
degree to which judges or participants were oriented to official law was a key to defining a 
tribunal a s  an  institution of informal justice. Thus parties may characterize a tribunal as  an 
institution of informal justice when it differs from the ideal in more fundamental ways than those 
that always characterize attempts to link ideal conceptual types to real world exemplars. This 
opens various possibilities of perception, confusion and misperception. For example, we can state 
more precisely why the label for cell 3 of Figure One did not quite fit. Whenever a party's 
participation is procedurally and substantively informal68 and the court's stance is procedurally 
step in to aid a tenant with an appeal, but in doing so their first concern as  one legal aid paralegal told me is to 
help the tenant find some "sugar daddy" who can give her money to clear her debt. 
68 Note that informality with respect to the substantive law i s  Weber's substantive rationality. Parties with an 
informal substantive orientation orient themselves to norms, but they are not legal ones. This can cause further 
confusion a s  the non-legal norms the two parties invoke need not be the same nor need they be the same as the 
norms the judge thinks relevant. 
informal and substantively legalistic, the party will believe her case is being heard in an  informal 
tribunal, but we will in fact have a situation of hidden legalism. On the other hand if the party's 
participation is procedurally informal but substantively legalistic and the court's is the same, we 
will have a n  informal legal forum - a s  in certain settlement conferences - in which informality 
provides an  efficient way of testing who has the better legal case. 
If one party and the judge are procedurally informal and substantively legalistic while the 
other party proceeds informally in both respects, the latter party is seriously disadvantaged for 
only her opponent is addressing the normative issues that  concern the court. This is essentially 
the situation of non-payment tenants before the eviction board today. They may respond 
expansively when the board asks them why they could not pay their rent, but they soon learn 
their responses don't matter. At an  earlier time in the board's history the situation was different, 
with the managers stubbornly holding out for what they saw as  the legally mandated outcome and 
the tenant and board responding to similar unofficial norms. The managers, of course, a s  repeat 
players, recognized the situation and they responded by withdrawing legitimacy from the board - 
it had weak judges and was a phony court. 69 
One could explore other combinations of party and court stances and party perceptions. 
Some may have characterized the eviction board in some cases (e.g. when Legal Aid represents a 
tenant) but not others, and some, no doubt, characterize other tribunals. However, I think I have 
said enough to make my point that  there is variance worth exploring here. I leave the exploration 
of other configurations and their perceptual and behavioral implications to those seeking to make 
sense of other forums. 
69 When the board was composed of Authority officials, the managers (and perhaps the tenants) assumed that the 
board despite its legal status and adjudicative function would respond to the manager's substantive concerns. 
Indeed, several managers described the board to me as a "kangaroo court." The label is further testimony to the 
power of keying (here the composition of the board is a key), for the board did not routinely ratify managerial 
discretion but reversed the managers in about a third of its cases. 
Conclusion 
I have suggested in this paper that Western observances and participants characterize 
tribunals as  formal and informal based on certain keys, such as the quality of the conversation the 
tribunal allows. These keys allow tribunals to be quite rule bound - both procedurally and 
substantively - yet still be characterized as  informal. I believe the Hawaii Housing Authority's 
eviction board is such a tribunal. If I am correct in my description, this board had its own rules of 
proceeding that were every bit as  regular and often almost as  inviolate a s  the rules that are 
codified in official courts.70 This was true both with respect to the procedures it followed and the 
substantive norms that it applied. 
There is nothing surprising here. Anthropologists have long documented procedural and 
substantive regularities in tribunals that to Western eyes (although perhaps not to native ones) 
appear informal. Fallers (1969), for example, tells us that transcripts of Soga trials read (to the 
Western observer) like one non sequitur after another, and the non sequiturs are sometimes 
interlarded with apparent contradictions. Natives, however, perceive legal principles that fill in 
gaps and resolve contradictions. Sociologists also have documented the fact that rules arise in 
informal interaction. This is true even when, as  was in some respects true of the eviction board, 
the rules are institutionalized largely within the confines of the interaction setting itself rather 
than, as  is true of most of the tribunals studied by anthropologists, also in a larger society (cf. 
Bohannan 1965). Thus Itoss (1970) reports liability rules (the rear driver in a collision is 
responsible) and damage rules (absent special circumstances damage awards equal three times the 
special damages) peculiar to plaintiff-insurance adjuster negotiations; Nonet (1969) describes the 
emergence in industrial accident tribunals of procedural and substantive rules that transformed 
the quality of hearings and prefigured legal change; and Emerson (1983) reports that rules can 
emerge even within a single day's session of a court, and that decisions are made with this 
possibility in mind. 
70 That rules change does not mean they are not binding as they exist at a given point in time. 
The image tha t  one sometimes encounters of informal tribunals a s  institutions that  are 
unbound by rules of procedure and free to do substantive justice in the manner of Weber's khadi is 
highly suspect. One may always search for and should expect to find rule-like regularities in the 
workings of informal tribunals, although the regularities may be quite different from those of 
ordinary courts. So long as  such regularities are not a n  ordinary court's regularities, they need 
not threaten perceptions of informality, for they will not key the concept "court of law." 
I have also tried to show, using the eviction board as an example, that  the kinds of 
proceedings that  we associate with informal tribunals not only affect outcomes in particular cases 
and behavior beyond outcomes but also lead to substantive rules of precedent and have 
implications for how that  precedent can change. In this connection I have argued that  a major 
difference between legalistic and informal procedure lies in the ways that  procedural and 
substantive norms are shaped and vulnerable to change. Indeed, the substantive norms that  
informal procedures shape can change even though a tribunal's way of proceeding remains in most 
obvious respects the same. Because informal procedure is a key to framing our conception of a 
tribunal, the casual observer or occasional participant may  misread the character of a tribunal 
and overlook or misread fundamental transformations in the nature of what is going on. In 
particular, a tribunal may be highly legalistic in its orientation to substantive norms, but a party 
may not realize this until its too late to save her case. 
The causal relationship between formal rules of procedure and substantive outcomes is a 
staple of law school civil procedure courses and social science investigation, but the substantive 
outcomes of concern are  ordinarily case outcomes rather than the generation of rules. It is clear 
from this work tha t  procedure can effect outcomes, but the relationship is not always a simple or 
expected one. Stapleton and Teitlebaum (1972), for example, found that  the usefulness of defense 
counsel in juvenile court varied with the characteristics of the court that  a youth confronted. The 
relationship between informal procedure and substantive outcomes has received less attention, 
although some recent work has begun to focus on this. I n  particular, Comaroff and Roberts' fine 
book (1981) calls our attention not only to the implications of process for substantive rules and 
outcomes but to the ways in which the concepts of process and rules can dissolve into each other. 
In making my arguments, I have drawn on the thirty year history of the Hawaiian 
Housing Authority's eviction board for inspiration and examples. Although the eviction board is a 
specialized agency, I believe, in part because of the work that I cite above, that much of what I 
have found is true of other informal tribunals, especially those that are closely linked to 
institutions of the regular legal system. (I am thinking here of such forums as  small claims 
courts, court-mandated mediation, court-annexed or contractually mandated arbitration, old-style 
juvenile courts and, in some countries, popular tribunals.) Whether I am right in these 
expectations - whether I have been writing about the "dynamics of informal justice" or just about 
"the case of a public housing eviction board" - is an empirical question. We need more studies that 
pay attention to the dynamics, in two senses, of the procedures we find in informal tribunals. 
First, we need studies that look a t  informality as the resultant of social forces and seek to 
understand informal procedures as products of the social situation of the tribunals in which they 
are embedded. Second, we need studies that look a t  informality as a moving force and ask how 
informality affects the behavior and outcomes in informal tribunals and whether it has larger 
social implications. My treatment of the HHA's eviction board is intended as an effort in these 
directions. 
REFERENCES 
ABEL, Richard (ed.) (1982) The Politics of Informal Justice. Vol. 1 & 2. New York: Academic 
Press. 
BOHANNAN, Paul (1965) "The Differing Realms of the Law," American Anthropologist, Special 
Publication, The Ethnog-raphv of Law. Laura Nader (ed.), Vol. 67, No. 6, Pt. 2 33-42. 
CAYTON, Nathan (1939) "Small Claims and Conciliation Courts," 205 Annals of the American 
kcademv of Political and Social Sciences 57. 
COMAROFF, John L. and Simon ROBERTS (1981) Rules and Processes: The Cultural Logic of 
Dispute in a n  African Context. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 
EMERSON, Robert (1983) "Holistic Effects in Social Control Decision Making," 17 Law & Societv 
Review 425-456. 
FALLERS, Lloyd (1969) Law Without Precedent: Legal Ideas in Action in the Courts of Colonial 
B_uaosa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
FELSTINER, William L.F., and Lynne A. WILLIAMS (1978) "Mediation as an  Alternative to 
Criminal Prosecution," 2 Law and Human Behavior 223-244. 
GIBBS, James L., J r .  (1963) "The Kpelle Moot," XXXIII Africa 1-10. 
GLUCKMAN, Max (1955) The Judicial Process Amone the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia 
Manchester: Manchester University Press; Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press. 
GOFFMAN, Erving (1974) Frame Analvski. New York: Colophon Books. 
HAWKINS, Keith (1984) Env' *n E f  ial Definition 
Pollution. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
KRONMAN, Anthony T. (1983). Max Weber. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
LEMPERT, Richard. (1971). "Evictions from Public Housing: A Sociological Inquiry," Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Dec., 197 1. 
LEMPERT, Richard and Joseph SANDERS (1986) An Invitation to Law and Social Science, New 
York: Longman Inc. 
NONET, Philippe (1969) Administrative Justice: Advocacv and C h a n ~ e  in a Government AP- -
New York: Russell Sage. 
O'BARR, William M. and John M. CONLEY (1985) "Litigant Satisfaction Versus Legal Adequacy 
in Small Claims Court Narratives," 19 Law & Societv Review 661. 
Project: The Legal Problems of the Rural Poor, (1969) 1969 Duke Law Journal 495. 
ROSS, H. Lawrence and John M. THOMAS (1981) "Blue-Collar Bureaucrats and the Housing 
Code Regulation in Three Cities." Paper presented a t  the 1981 meeting of the Association 
for Public Policy Analysis and Management, Washington, D.C., October 23, 198 1. 
ROSS, H. Lawrence (1970) Settled Out of Court: The Social Process of Insurance Claims 
U u s t m e n t .  Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co. 
SMITH, Reginald H. (1919) J u s t i c e  Chicago: American Judicature Society . 
[Bulletin VII]; Reprinted, Chicago: National Legal Aid and Defenders Association, 1967. 
STAPLETON, W. Vaughan and Lee E. TEITLEBAUM (1972) In  Defense of Youth. New York: 
Russell Sage Foundation. 
TRUBEK, David. (1972). "Max Weber on Law and the Rise of Capitalism," l3hcansin Law 
Review, 720-753. 
WEBER, Max. (1968). Economv and Societv. Vol. 1 & 2. (Guenter h t h  & Claus Wittich, Eds.). 
New York: Bedminster Press. 
WHEELER, Stanton, Edna BONACICH, M. Richard CRAMER and Irving K. ZOLA (1968) 
"Agents of Delinquency Control: A Comparative Analysis," in Stanton Wheeler, (ed.), 
Controlling. Delinquents 31, 54m, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
YNGVESSON, Barbara and Patricia HENNESSEY (1975) "Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A 
Review of the Small Claims Literature," 9 Law & Society Review 219. 
CASES 
Thorpe v. H o u s i n ~  Authoritv of the Citv of Durham, 336 U 6 7 0  (1967). 

